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The definition of autobiography, in the literal meaning of the word, is divided into 
its three parts: 'auto', ‘bio，，'graphy' 一 'self-life-writing'. The focus of debate has shifted 
from bios to autos—from the life to the self—in autobiographical criticism in recent 
decades. In the contextualization of autobiography in individualism, the concept of truth 
of self takes on the notion of truth of the individual. It is modified as the concept of 
fictions of self/self as fiction as the debate shifts to the autobiography's claim to 
referentiality. The concept of self as fiction also directs one to a new conception of 
subjectivity in the autobiographical genre, as the self is considered not only a fiction but 
also an articulation of subjectivity of other discourses that constitute the self. The 
relationality of self and life writing becomes the focus of the debate, as the Other makes a 
more prominent presence in the definition of self in the genre. 
Based on the changing conception of self in autobiographical criticism, this thesis 
explores the use of multiple selves in autobiographical fictions in Philip Roth's The 
Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography, Milan Kundera's The Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting, Paul Auster's The Invention of Solitude, which employ a series of fictive 
selves to construct the autobiographical selves. The concept of je est un autre is 
embedded in the use of fictive selves in the context of this thesis: the authors of my texts 
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transform themselves into a fictive persona who narrates the autobiography, or one of the 
characters who narrates the stories of both himself and his others. The discussion of the 
three texts is an examination of the changing conception of self in the autobiographical 
genre, from the nature of self as autonomous to the self as inter-subjective and relational. 
The distinction between self and other is ultimately invalidated, as the stories of different 
selves share the same form of truth or the impossibility of the truth; or as self and the 
world comes into a synthesis in the textual universe of one's creation, where the 
autobiographer is united with or immersed in his others. 
Starting with the question of how the autobiographer communicates the truth 
about himself, the thesis explores the multiple selves in autobiographical fictions and 
















The definition of autobiography, in the literal meaning of the word, is divided into its 
three parts: 'auto', ‘bio’，'graphy' - 'self-life-writing'. In his essay 'Autobiography and 
Cultural Moment', James Olney revisits the definition of the genre and discusses the shift 
of attention from bios to autos一from the life to the s e l f i n autobiographical criticism in 
recent decades. Much of the early criticism on the autobiographical mode focuses on the 
bios, the assumption that autobiography could signify the course of a lifetime or at least a 
significant portion of the life. Such an assumption created the questions over 'truth' in the 
autobiographical genre: the questions of self-definition, self-existence, or self-deception, 
of whether the autobiographer deliberately alters details of his life in the writing. The 
turning to autos provided an answer to this question in autobiographical criticism, as the 
self is seen to have its own reason and its truth. The question remains whether life and 
self exist as completed, defined entities or whether they come into being through the act 
of writing. The special interest critics have taken in autobiography, in Olney，s 
conclusion, springs from one's fascination with the self and its 'profound, its endless 
mysteries'; and the study of autobiography is the examination of how the self 'defines 
itself from moment to moment amid the buzz and confusion of the external world as a 
security against [the] outside whirl' (Olney 'Autobiography and Cultural Moment, 19-
24). Olney，s conception of a transcendent subject in autobiography echoes the 
existentialist self conceived by Gusdorf. The emphasis on unity of self is also a product 
of the contextualization of autobiography in individualism: the creation and presentation 
of the individual as a unique, autonomous being, whose truth contains value on its own 
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and is a contribution to the world one lives in. The emphasis on the truth of self is 
transformed into the concept of fictions of self/self as fiction, which becomes an 
important defense for autobiography's claim to referentiality. The concept of self as 
fiction contributes to further changes in the conception of subjectivity in the 
autobiographical genre, as the self is not only a fiction but an articulation of subjectivity 
of other discourses that constitute the self. The relational nature of self and life writing is 
given a much stronger emphasis as the Other makes a more prominent presence in the 
definition of self in the autobiographical genre. 
The shifting of focus from bios to autos in autobiographical criticism is also 
evident in the changes in forms of autobiographical writings in the last few decades. The 
notion of self/self as fictions, for example, has opened door for autobiographical writings 
in which the truth of the author's story is communicated through fictions, such as So 
Long, See You Tomorrow by William Maxwell. Based on the changing conception of self 
in autobiographical criticism, this thesis explores the issue of self-presence and self-
creation through multiple selves in autobiographical fictions under the light of je est un 
autre: the speaking of oneself as other. The texts chosen for this study are Philip Roth's 
The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography’ Milan Kundera's The Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting, Paul Auster's The Invention of Solitude, on the ground that these texts 
explore the issue of how one presents one's self - an interiority - through the interaction 
of multiple and Active selves. The term 'multiple selves', when applied to my chosen 
texts, includes both the autobiographical selves and the fictive selves of the authors' 
creation. All selves are mutually interactive and constructive, and the autobiographical 
selves are created through collisions with its others in the autobiographical fictions. The 
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concept je est un autre is embedded in the concept of fictions of self/self as fiction in its 
different facets in the context of this thesis: the authors of my texts, as autobiographers, 
explicitly transforms themselves into a fictive persona who narrates the autobiography, or 
one of the characters who narrates the stories of both oneself and his others; and the 
fictions of the authors' life is speculated or revealed through the fictions of other selves in 
the texts. The choice of these texts is, more importantly, grounded in their demonstration 
of the changing conception of self in autobiographical criticism: from contextualization 
of autobiography in individualism, to the nature of self as inter-subjective or relational, 
the three texts provide examples of autobiographers' attempts in defining themselves 
through writing. The fictions of selves are constructed in the narratives to highlight the 
nature of self as multiple, as each of the texts is a composite of other texts. The 
distinction between self and other is ultimately invalidated, as the stories of different 
selves share the same form of truth or the impossibility of the truth; or as self and the 
world come into a synthesis in the textual universe of one's creation, where the 
autobiographer is united with or immersed in his others. 
To provide an overview of the thesis, this chapter is devoted to the discussion of 
the theoretical framework - the changing conception of self in autobiographical criticism 
- t h e study is placed in. The relationship between autobiography and individualism is 
discussed from the perspective of unity of self in autobiographical criticism. The concept 
fictions of self/self as fiction is explored from a similar angle, with a special focus on the 
possible abuse of the notion of the truth of self. The fictiveness of self - both as the 
writing persona and the written self in the text - brings our discussion to the problem of 
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referentiality in autobiographical writings, and points to the conception of self as multiple 
and relational in nature. 
. U n i t y of Self and Individualism 
In the chapter titled 'Autobiography and historical consciousness' in 
Auto/biographical discourses: theory, criticism, practice, Laura Marcus traces the 
development of criticism on autobiography along the line of 'liberal pessimism', to which 
a 'decline' model of autobiographical history is central, and in which dominant 
conceptions of individualism are conflated with autobiographical representations (Marcus 
135). At the beginning of the line is Wilhelm Dilthey, whose hermeneutics, with their 
emphasis on unity and coherence as fundamental principles, prefigure the critical and 
conceptual focus which has come to largely dominate the critical field of 
autobiographical studies (148). Georg Misch, adopts a similar position in his Geschichte 
der Autobiographie, in which the self-identity of author and subject is the essential 
definition of autobiography as a genre. As Marcus points out, the importance of author-
subject identity for Misch is primarily that it secures the same intrinsic unity and 
coherence individual lives are considered to possess (149-50): 
...the man who sets out to write the story of his own life has it in view as a 
whole, with a unity and direction and a significance of its own. In this single 
whole the facts and feelings, actions and reactions, recalled by the authors...all 
have their definite place, thanks to their significance in relation to the 
whole...This knowledge, which enables the writer to conceive his life as a single 
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whole, has grown in the course of his life out of his actual experience (qtd. in 
Marcus 150) 
For Misch, the question of fact in autobiography is replaced by the quest for coherence, 
and subjective truth acquires the status of objective truth. One could find echoes of 
Misch’s thoughts in Georges Gusdorf s influential essay, in which he lays out several 
presuppositions of the writing of autobiography, the most prominent one being existential 
anxiety. The proper task of autobiography is to reconstruct the unity of life, as the 
autobiographer achieves his 'special unity and identity across time': ‘to reassemble the 
scattered elements of his individual life and regroup them in a comprehensive 
sketch... [the autobiographer] strains towards a complete and coherent expression of his 
entire destiny' (Gusdorf 35). Gusdorf also claims autobiography to be ‘one of the means 
to self-knowledge thanks to the fact that it recomposes and interprets a life in its totality', 
and it reveals '[my] individual unity, the mysterious essence of my being' (37). In this 
context, autobiography provides more the path to self-redemption than to self-knowledge, 
as one sets out to recover the elements that have constituted his destiny, upon realizing 
how all lives are 'inwardly botched' (39). Autobiography acquires a privileged status as it 
is ‘a second reading of experience', and truth emerges in this reading (37). Truth in 
autobiography is a 'more profound sense of truth as an expression of inmost being' in 
one's present consciousness (38). For both Misch and Gusdorf, the autobiography's task 
is to capture the truth of self of the autobiographer, since autobiography springs from 
one's self-awareness and subsequently one's need of self-assertion. 
One of the implications in the writings of Misch and Gusdorf is the relationship 
between autobiography as a form and individualism as an ideology. As subjective truth is 
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elevated to the status of objective truth, autobiographies demonstrate the coherence and 
consistency in and of the development of Western man and can be seen as a celebration 
of autonomous individualism (Marcus 153). This line of thought was developed by critics 
as Roy Pascal and Karl Weintraub, who represent ‘an orthodox line of liberal cultural 
criticism' (Marcus 154) and emphasize the synthesis between individualism and 
historical consciousness. In Design and Truth in Autobiography, Pascal formulates his 
conception of the inter-relationship between self and the world and between past and 
present: 
...the center of interest [in autobiography] is the self...though necessarily 
the outside world must appear so that, in give and take with it, the personality 
finds its peculiar shape. The writing of autobiography imposes a pattern on a life, 
constructs out of a coherent story...in every case it is [the writer's] present 
position which enables him to see his life as something of a unity (9) 
Adopting a similar position as Misch's and Gusdorf s, Pascal asserts the evidence of a 
personality to be the truth in autobiography, and the unity of the text is a precondition of 
this evidence. One must see the development of personality in stages, as historical 
consistency can reveal the true evidence of the personality even if psychological 
consistency is not immediately apparent. There is also 'a failure' if an autobiography 
does not bring home to the readers the present situation of the autobiographer, or if the 
personality in the autobiography appears trivial, since they are the criterion by which we 
understand and/or even judge an autobiography (9). Pascal's emphasis on the present 
perspective of the autobiographer's is shared by Weintraub, who writes ‘the retrospective 
perspective, as well as the author's motivation and intention for writing must be 
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recaptured for a proper understanding of the autobiographical effort' {The Value of The 
Individual xviii). In his essay 'Autobiography and Historical Consciousness', Weintraub 
specifies this perspective as 'a moment of crisis or beyond an experience, or a cumulative 
set of experiences which can play the same function as a crisis' in the autobiographer's 
life, since the readers can only understand the pattern and meaning of the life recounted 
from this standpoint (825-6). Weintraub's formulation of the 'moment of crisis' 
authorizes the present standpoint as an enlightened one, one that illuminates the true 
meaning of the autobiographer's life as it has never before. The presence of this present 
standpoint authorizes the version of personality being presented, which communicates the 
inner core of the autobiographer. 
Autobiography, in Pascal's discussion, is considered to have been inspired by a 
'reverence for self: the individual feels responsible for himself and thus traces his self in 
its 'delicate uniqueness', as well as its 'historical identity, in all its particularity' (181). 
Ideally, autobiography involves an interplay between self and the world through which 
the self comes into being, one that is most effective in Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit, 
where the '[history] of self and history of the world are inextricably linked' (Weintraub 
'Autobiography and Historical Consciousness' 847). Pascal communicates similar 
sentiments in his statement about the 'decisive achievement' of autobiography: 'to give 
us events that are symbolic of the personality as an entity unfolding not solely according 
to its own laws, but also in response to the world it lives in' (185). The relationship 
between the individual and the world ultimately points to the truth of self in the text, 
since the autobiographer's self is expressed in his personality as it appears to the world. 
Such conception should ideally place autobiography in the 'outside' world as much as the 
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‘inner’ world of the individual, and contribute to the genre's status as literature through 
which both writers and readers know life. It seems to be Pascal has in mind when he 
proposes autobiography is a form of 'active contribution', as the autobiographer presents 
an order of values that is his own (193). Pascal's ideas have their repercussions in The 
Value of the Individual, where Weintraub discusses a modem historical outlook that 
places 'immense value on the specific goodness of each individually specified expression 
of the human experience': 
Man, however limited he might be in each distinct formulation of his being, 
redeemed himself by the successive actualizations of his indefinitely variable 
potential. Each style of life has its own intrinsic justification; each has the right to 
be understood in its own terms; each deserves loving attention as another human 
search for humanity. History thus becomes the passing scene of possible human 
forms (xii) 
The relationship between individual and the world is modified by Weintraub to be one of 
mutual influence: the individual is seen to adhere to 'great personality ideals in which 
their culture tends to embody its values and objectives', and on the other hand, to hold 
onto 'a commitment to a self for which there is no model' (xvi). In Weintraub's 
formulation, the self-representation of the autobiographer necessarily embodies the spirit 
of his time, and the writing of his life story contributes to the understanding of the 
spectrum of individuality and history. Such assumption would no longer hold if the value 
of the individual is developed to the extreme 一 it is easy for an individual to indulge in 
the uniqueness of his existence but not for him or her to recognize the existence of 
another individual to be equally unique. The 'greatly enriched view of humanity' could 
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turn reductive, as the 'task of self-exploration and self-defmition can consume life to the 
danger point of morbid self-inspection and egocentricism' (xii-xvi). The notion of the 
truth of self is thus potentially self-undermining, since it may lead to an overt emphasis 
on interiority of the autobiographers, to the point where the external world does not exist. 
Such autobiographies lose their value as documents of individuality, since the concept of 
individuality would no longer hold when the individual is blind to the world. 
Fictions of Self/Self as Fiction 
The relationship between autobiography and individualism seems to weigh less in 
later autobiographical criticism, as the debate shifts to the use of fictions in 
autobiography and the genre's claim to referentiality. The concept of fictions of self/self 
as fictions, however, is essentially a modification of the views of earlier critics' who see 
the coherence of life story as the blueprint of the truth of the autobiographer. The later 
critics who argue for fictions of self/self as fiction are in fact defending unity of self from 
another perspective, as they assert autobiography's task is to capture one's inner reality 
and fictions enable the autobiographer to achieve psychological unity. The present 
standpoint of the autobiographer continues to occupy a central place in autobiographical 
criticism, as it allows the autobiographer to negotiate between his past and his present 
and to reconstruct his life story according to his present identity. The union of past self 
and present self, or of conflicting selves at different points of time in one's life, is a 
fiction that is certified as one of the major achievements of the autobiographical genre. 
The relationship self and the world more explicitly favors the former, as the truth of one's 
inner world is legitimized as the autobiographical truth one seeks. 
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The use of fictions in autobiography is endowed with an ethical dimension if one 
shares Fyre's view: ‘in the form of representational fiction', autobiography assigns 
motives, causes and effects 'according to our best lights rather than according to the 
absolute truth' (151). For critics such as Kermode and Olney, fictions are necessary 
constructs that protect humans from the whirl of the outside world. In his first book on 
autobiography, Metaphors of Self, Olney stresses the inter-relationship between self and 
the world: one explores the world and finds it in himself, as the two share the same 
metaphysics and merge in his consciousness (14). Autobiography captures the life of the 
autobiographer, which is a 'vertical thrust' down to the 'roots of individual being' rather 
than a 'horizontal thrust from the present into the past' (Olney ‘The Ontology of 
Autobiography' 239-41). The truth of one's consciousness thus seems to embody the 
truth of both 'inner' and 'outer' world. Olney's brand of transcendental subjectivism may 
not apply to most contemporary autobiographies, but the privileging of subjectivism is 
central to critics who see fictions of self as the autobiographical truth. In Fictions in 
Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention, Paul John Eakin conceives the 
autobiographer's self or his life of consciousness to be the referent in autobiography. As 
self becomes the referent in the text, the fictions he constructs about himself are the truth 
about his life or self. Fiction can acquire the status of fact - the fact of the life of 
consciousness 一 since the text is the site where the autobiographer negotiates the terms 
of his psychological reality. Fiction provides ‘a privileged bridge of discourse of the self 
with itself across lapsing time', and autobiography is essentially a kind of 'existential 
fiction，(24). Autobiography is a ceaseless process of identity formation in which new 
versions of the past evolve to meet the constantly changing requirements of the self in 
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each successive present, and the manifestation of an underlying psychological unity to 
which it ostensibly refers (36). The autobiographical self is an invention of the narrative, 
and does not otherwise exist. 
Eakin's conception frees the autobiographer from the question of factuality, and 
develops earlier critics' concept of self as fiction. By seeing autobiography as a kind of 
'existential fiction', a site where the autobiographer can invent and re-invent his identity, 
the split between the writing self and his written selves, or between one written self and 
another becomes the motivation for re-invention. Differences and shifts in identities can 
be seen as one of the many negotiations the autobiographer undertakes, who now has 
greater authority and freedom over his self-representation. The conception of 
autobiographical self as an invention also defends the autobiographer from the charges of 
fictionalization, if essence of his self-presentation - his self - is necessarily fictive in 
nature. In his next book Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography, which focuses 
on the externally referential in the genre, Eakin refines his view on unity of self: the 
bridging of past and present represents ‘the fulfillment of a wish to be present once more 
to one's past, such that the telltate marks of temporal, psychological, and linguistic 
discontinuity paradoxically facilitate belief in continuity of identity, belief in the notion 
that the present self can establish direct contact with the [earlier] self from the past' (35). 
Eakin's conclusion is insightful for discussing the writers included in his books, such as 
Mary McCarthy, Henry James and Sartre, but I have reservations about whether it would 
be as illuminating if one discusses lesser writers under the same light. The writers in 
Eakin's discussion would be, in Mandel's words, autobiographers who trust their 
experience to illuminate the significance behind pictures of their memories in the context 
Wong 12 
of their total experience, and transform them in their autobiographies as existential fiction 
(Mandel 52). One might argue for the notion that written self or selves in an 
autobiography reveal the truth about the autobiographer at the moment of writing, but it 
does not necessarily bridge the gap between the two: the gap could be exaggerated when 
a reader sees the autobiographer struggling to bridge or even obliterate it. The 'truth of 
man' may stand, but it remains unsettling for the readers when they sense a significant 
difference between the autobiographer's truth and the truth we perceive. The privileging 
of subjective truth is meant to establish the platform of communication between the 
writer and his readers and between the writer and himself, so that the truth of the 
autobiographer can be shared, understood and empathized. When the autobiographer 
borders on self-deception in his autobiographical enterprise, his interiority is concealed 
by and lost in his lies, rather than portrayed and preserved in the text. The concept of self 
as invention in autobiography is potentially self-reductive, when one exploits the 
emphasis on interiority as the tool of self-glorification. 
Fictionalitv,Referentialitv,Relationalitv 
As I mentioned in my introductory paragraphs of this chapter, the central question 
of this thesis is how the autobiographer communicates his self, and my answer isje est un 
autre. The concept of the autobiographer speaking as another is nothing new in 
autobiographical criticism, as he/she is necessarily bound by the problem of split 
intentionality. In his essay 'The Veto of Imagination: A Theory of Autobiography', Louis 
A. Renza outlines the paradox of self-abnegation: as the T becomes a ‘he，，how can the 
autobiographer continue to claim this existence as his own, and that his T is a secure 
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referential source for his writing? (279). Renze attempts to draw, from his careful 
examination of the relationship between split intentionality and different modes of 
autobiography, the conclusion that autobiography is neither fact nor fiction一not even a 
mixture of the two (273). The autobiographer is separated from the 'referent' in the text, 
since 'the nature of autobiographical writing precludes the possibility that the writer can 
deliberately adopt a persona behind which he conceals references to his own life', and the 
materials are potentially unverifiable for the autobiographer, who is now reading his 
‘other’，one that he 'intends' as he writes (292). Although Renza criticizes critics such as 
Olney who see autobiography as 'definitions of the self at the moment of writing' of 
their ‘genre nominalism', his conclusion of autobiography being 'a unique, self-defining 
mode of self-referential expression, one that allows, then inhibits, its ostensible project of 
self-representation' may not be as different from the views he criticizes as he insists (274， 
295). Renza's conclusion, in a way, echoes the view of autobiography as self-invention: 
the written self is one invented as the autobiographer writes, a view commonly held by 
critics who defend the use of fictions in autobiography. The conception of such a view, 
however, has its roots in seeing self as the referent in autobiography: the truth of self is 
captured in fiction, and such truth cannot be questioned since it is necessarily true about 
the autobiographer at the moment of writing. 
Renza’ s article is important to the conception of my argument in this thesis, since 
the major question I address is the possibility of presenting one's interiority in writing. 
According to the deconstructionist argument, the self is only ostensibly presented by the 
subject in the autobiographical narrative, and both 'self and 'subject' are narrative 
constructions. While the deconstructionists criticize earlier critics' demand for unity and 
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emphasize the self as de-centered, one might recall how Gusdorf and others have also 
proposed that self, or individual destiny, is made up of scattered elements that find their 
realization in writing. In Derrida and Autobiography, Robert Smith pinpoints the nature 
of self-representation as a matter of the subject telling its story to itself: 
autobiography begins with self-colloquy, writing to the self in an internal 
vocative mode.. .autobiography can take the form of self-enclosure, but it can 
only do so when the subject has first effected a minimal distancing of the self in 
order to address it (Smith 63). 
One is again reminded of Gusdorf s essay, in which he states how one must take a certain 
distance from oneself in an autobiographical act, though such distancing is a means of 
achieving the special unity of the self for earlier critics. The distance between writing self 
and its written self points to a series of questions regarding the referentiality of self: is 
communication between oneself and his/her self possible? How can autobiography claim 
to present the self, if self exists as a non-textual interiority within the autobiographer? Is 
there such interiority within oneself as an intrinsic entity, and what constitutes it? How 
does one read the self through reference to it, or what claim to referentiality does the self 
have when it is a fiction itself? In 'Fictions of Self: The End of Autobiography', Michael 
Sprinker announces: 
...the self can no more be author of its own discourse than any producer of 
a text can be called the author""“that is the originator~of his own writing... 
Every text is an articulation of the relations between texts, a product of 
intertextuality, a waving together of what has been produced elsewhere in 
discontinuous form; every subject, every author, every self is the articulation of an 
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intersubjectivity structured within and around the discourses available to it at any 
moment in time (325). 
The title of Sprinker's essay ostensibly summarizes the fate of autobiography in the age 
of postmodernism and deconstruction. Autobiography as a self-referential document is 
somehow untenable as the self is constituted by others, though an altered notion of self or 
subjectivity can engender an altered conception of the genre. In 'Autobiography in the 
Aftermath of Romanticism', Candace Lang discusses the fragility of the distinction 
between subject and other―“of self and other, individuality and collective—and 
concludes: 
To write, be it in the form of a self-referential first-person discourse or of 
an ‘impersonal，，third-person narrative, can no longer be conceived of as an act of 
singular authority, but must be understood as a process of collaboration between 
an individual consciousness and that Other which permeates it (16，emphasis 
original) 
The self is defined as self in relation to the other, while both self and other are 
necessarily multiple. In How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, Paul John Eakin 
addresses how we are conditioned not to recognize the relational dimension of self-hood 
by possessive individualism (63). The self s claim to referentiality rests in the recognition 
of the others which comprises the self. The story about oneself does not become ancillary 
to the stories of others, as the latter is an integral part of the story about the self. In 
autobiographical writings that revolve around the idea of relational lives/selves, identities 
are conceived as relational and the narratives defy the boundary we try to establish 
between genres. The autobiography of oneself often offers the biograph(ies) and the 
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autobiograph(ies) of the other(s) (58). In the context of this thesis, the fictions of oneself 
offer as well as consist of the fictions about other selves. The autobiographical selves are 
partially constructed by other selves, and the narratives' claim to referentiality comes 
from the authors' acknowledgements of the fictiveness and relationality of their selves. 
Within the framework of conception of self in autobiographical criticism, the 
thesis is structured along the changes in such a conception, beginning from self as an 
autonomous being to the self as an inter-subjectivity. As the foregrounding of my 
discussion of multiple selves in autobiographical fictions, Chapter Two explores the 
danger inherent in the demand for unity of self in the autobiographical genre, and the use 
of fictions as possible expressions of autobiographical truth. Chapter Three is, firstly, an 
extended discussion on the contextualization of autobiography in individualism and the 
abuse of autobiography it renders, also from the perspective of the pressure exerted by 
the demand for unity. Secondly, it is an examination of the concept of self-invention in 
autobiography in its different facets: the use of fictions in autobiography as a means of 
achieving one's psychological unity, and the creation of fictive selves as a part of the 
autobiographical story. Chapter Four explores the inherent difficulties in the 
understanding and presenting the self due to the nature of self as essentially multiple and 
contradictory, and the creation of autobiographical self as an inter-subjectivity of all 
selves that comprise the self in the textual universe. The notion je est un autre is 
illumined in the use of fictions - in the form of 'mirror texts' - which are constructed by 
the author as the means of breaking down the boundary between self and other, past and 
present, individual and collective. Starting with the question of how the autobiographer 
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presents and creates his self in the text, the thesis explores the multiple selves in 




Earlier autobiographical criticism, as I discussed in Chapter One, is contextualized in the 
development of Western culture of individualism. Autobiographies are considered 
histories of personalities, albeit autonomous individuals. Consistency in the text - both 
historical and psychological - is a main concern for the critics since they consider a 
coherent life story to be the basis of subjective truth. The uniqueness of the individual is 
seen to be inter-twined with the uniqueness of his circumstance, as self comes into being 
through its interplay with the world. The synthesis between self and the world is, on the 
other hand, a part of the critics' conception of unity of self: the story of the 
autobiographer's life reveals his inner core, as it appears to the world through his self-
representation. 
As the foregrounding of my discussion on the notion of je est un autre and 
multiple selves, this chapter focuses on the problematic of reconstruction of life as a 
coherent whole, an autobiographical enterprise Philip Roth parodies in The Facts: A 
Novelist's Autobiography. The first of Roth's autobiographical tetralogy', the half 
autobiographical, half meta-fictional text offers a mock example and a critique of classic 
autobiography as history of personality, through which the autobiographer claims to 
present his inner core. The denial of distance between oneself and his self - writing self 
and written self, present self and past self - is inter-twined with the emphasis on the 
present standpoint of the autobiographer. Such a present standpoint is exposed as an 
accomplice to his arbitrary shaping of the past, which is grounded in the demand for unity 
of self. The demand for synthesis between self and the world is caricatured as self-
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undermining, as contradictions surface in the text and illuminate how one's self-
representation simply conforms to the stereotypes of one's time. The shattering of the 
autobiographer's present perspective points to the possibility of a counter-text to the 
written version, a scenario manifested in the paratext in The Facts. The dialogue between 
the narrator of the autobiography and his fictional alter-ego suggests an oppositional 
reading that is discouraged in a conventional autobiography. The interaction between the 
two selves points to the impossibility of presenting one's self - as an defined entity - in 
the text, since the self is necessarily multiple, and manifests itself in contradictory facets. 
The fictions of selves suggest another kind of unity in the autobiographical narrative: the 
idea of self as narrative convention, as the creation of alternate existences. In the absence 
of a singular autobiographical self, Philip Roth makes his presence felt through 
impersonations. The truth of the author is speculated and revealed through multiple 
selves in autobiographical fictions, an idea central to my thesis that I will elaborate in the 
next chapter. 
Having entered the autobiographical pact proposed by Philippe Lejeune, the 
identical name of author, narrator and character", The Facts qualifies as an autobiography 
and has been labeled as such since its publication in 1988. The autobiography is framed 
by a paratext - a letter from Roth to his self-proclaimed fictional alter-ego, Nathan 
Zuckerman, the protagonist of his novels Zuckerman Bound: A Trilogy and Epilogue"^ 
and The CounteHife, and a reply from Zuckerman at the end of the book. Both Roth and 
Zuckerman are protagonists created by Philip Roth the author, and the former plays the 
role of autobiographer in the text. In his letter to Zuckerman, Roth lays out his 
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motivations behind the writing of autobiography: a crisis-induced desire for 
understanding his life and returning to the past where the deaths of his parents did not 
exist. The real motivation, however, is his longing to be reengaged with his real self, to 
recover from fiction fatigue after having fictionalized himself for too long in his novels. 
In affirming his faithfulness to the facts - how he presents himself 'undisguised' - Roth 
modifies it by stating how his narrative is 'a sequence of stories' constructed to 'bind up 
the facts with a persuasive hypothesis that unravels [his] history's meaning' (4，8， 
emphasis original). The representation was partly shaped by his concerns of the privacy 
of his significant others, which he wanted to protect as much as possible. The referential 
value of the autobiography, however, is beyond question: Roth insists how, opposed to 
his novel, his autobiography is the first thing he has ever written 'unconsciously' and 
sounds more like the voice of the written self (5. 9). Not only the distance between past 
and present is bridged, but also the distance between oneself and one's self - between the 
recounting self and the recounted self. The denial of distance is grounded in the present 
situation of the autobiographer, whose purpose of writing is self-redemption. 
The present standpoint of the autobiographer's, as I argued in the last chapter, is 
the precondition of unity of self in the text. Roth's self-parody in The Facts reads like a 
direct attack on many of the critics' arguments for both the present standpoint and the 
unity it renders. The relationship between part and whole — or in Pascal's formulation, the 
‘decisive element' of autobiography: 'the meaning an event acquires when viewed in the 
perspective of a whole life' - depends on the consistency of the personality portrait, a 
demand that is revealed as self-contradictory in The Facts (18). Divided into six parts, a 
prologue and five chapters, the autobiography traces Roth's growth as a young man and 
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an artist through stages of development of a personality, which ends the moment when 
the individual has seemingly solidified his identity. The weaving together of one's 
personality is never as seamless in real life, and The Facts gives a parody of an 
autobiographer whose efforts in maintaining the consistency of his personality portrait 
are often at odds with one another. The prologue establishes the 'credo of his 
childhood'—‘the Jewish family was an inviolate haven against every form of menace' 
(Wirth-Nesher 261，Roth 14). Narrative is the main form Roth's father knowledge takes, 
who is the original mold for Roth's identity and whose repertoire is passed onto the latter: 
family, Newark, Jew (16). The next chapter, ‘Safe at Home’，underscores the centrality of 
his Jewish-American identity. The child perceived the world through the perspective of 
the Jewish community in Newark, a haven that was occasionally threatened by gentile 
hostility. Roth was the moderate child he was because of the non-combative nature of 
Jews, while his family life was a product of the time: his father's moderate success at an 
established insurance company was due to and despite of the anti-Semitism in the 
American society. For Roth and his fellow Jews, their Jewish identity was 
unquestionable, while their experience as Jews in America was the primary means by 
which they 'deepened' their 'Americanness' (31，emphasis original). In the third chapter, 
'Joe College', Roth's development as a young man takes on the prototype of autonomous 
individual, who is shaped by his circumstance but always triumphs over it. The young 
man broke away from a series of safe circle: home, Newark, Jewish fraternity, literary 
circle, exclusive relationship with a gentile young girl and finally, undergraduate studies 
in his early twenties. The young talent, like Benjamin Franklin, was the leader among his 
peers, criticized others' mischief, wrote several pieces of prose, satirized his rival 
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newspaper, was most well-read and competitive in his circle, dated a girl who was 
generally well-behaved, skipped town for other pursuits. 
Throughout the narration Roth often reminds the readers of his keywords: 'Jews' 
and 'American', since he conceives himself as a writer whose innate taste for comic 
mockery is essentially Jewish, and as a man who is determined to be a self-reliant, 
American hero. His actions and reactions throughout the autobiography might be in 
accord with the inner core he presents of himself, yet it is precisely this consistency that 
arouses distrust in the readers. Zuckerman is correct as he points out Roth had worked out 
in his mind the formula of who he is, and the representation could be anybody (165). The 
representation comes across as elusive and self-contradictory at various points, when the 
autobiographer is close to the point of having to reveal the truth about his actions. In 'Girl 
of My Dreams', the readers are introduced to the character named Josie, who is 'a hard-
up loser...a penniless secretary and divorced women of two small children' (105)，the 
disastrous ex-wife who dominated Roth's imagination for over two decades and appears 
as different impersonations in several of Roth's novels. The initial encounter, as the 
autobiographer admits, was partly triggered by his drunkenness after a party. To maintain 
his self image as the Jewish young man who is self-sufficient, adventurous, and at the 
heart of heterogeneity of American culture, the trigger is modified by his recognition of 
her exoticness: Josie was the world's victim, ‘a dispossessed refugee from a 
sociobiological background to which my own was deemed, by both old- and new-world 
racial mythology, to be subservient, if not inferior' (82). Roth puts it more clearly later in 
the autobiography, that he was an idealistic young man who saw Josie as a harder test in 
life because of her background. The rationale about people being naive: 'even the 
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brightest, and not just as youngsters either' seems reasonable enough, but it is a cover for 
his real motive as much as the equation of Josie with 'the world's victim' (90). In a 
description of the early stage of their affair, Roth mentions how his tales of safe Jewish 
haven could never have enticed the same fascination in other girls he had dated, who 
were raised by doting parents in more prosperous families. At this point one might expect 
Roth to tell his readers the real reason behind his affair with Josie, and the explanation 
turns out to be 'an innate taste for dramatic juxtaposition, an infatuation with the couple 
of seemingly alien perspectives' (93). Roth attempts to take cover in another confession 
of immaturity and naivety: ‘I was...motivated by an egoistic young lover's predilection 
for intimacy and sincerity...telling her who I thought I was and what I believed had 
informed me', but stressing how he was also 'engaged by a compelling form of narrative 
responsory' (93). 
In his critique Zuckerman traces the pattern of Roth's romantic life from another 
perspective: Roth was raised to be reliable in the Jewish community he grew up in and 
his reliability became the magnet to the broken, women who were either addicted, 
fatherless, or both (182). Having fit into the role of a 'crutch', Roth could not date any 
woman who was more independent, or could not keep those he dated who only needed 
him as a ‘cock’ (183). A more significant reason is hidden, however, since any rational 
man would have recognized Josie meant disaster. Zuckerman accuses Roth of idealizing 
the past because of ‘a need for reconciliation with the tribe', including his dead mother 
and in view of the imminent death of his father (173). Zuckerman thus concludes that real 
reason is Roth's hatred the Jewish community he grew up in, which he refuses to touch 
on in the autobiography. The hatred is concealed in the mask of an irreducible Jewishness 
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Roth repeatedly claims for himself, an element of himself that is even intrinsic to his 
identity as an American. The hatred, being internalized, turned into self-hatred and the 
tendency to sabotage, and Josie, the gentle woman who promised destruction, was the 
logical choice for Roth as he asserted his manhood. This self-hatred is the cause of the 
charges of anti-Semitism against Roth in the chapter ‘All in the Family', charges 
considered to be valid by Zuckerman, but declared by Roth to be the product of Jews' 
insecurity more than that of his satirical stories. There is no way one could find out 
whether this version is the truth, though it counter balances Roth's explanations for his 
actions and the arbitrary coherence of his Jewish-American identity. It is also 
illuminating over Roth's emphasis on his Jewishness and his taste for satire and comic 
mockery being an innate quality of Jews, since it would work as an implicit self-defense 
against the charges of anti-Semitism. Another contradiction it might explain is Roth's 
treatment of his family in his autobiography, who Roth declared to be central to his 
identity formation and yet has little presence in the text. Roth's mother, referred to as the 
‘Jewish Florence Nightingale' and the seal coat baby Philip clung onto in the prologue, 
plays no significant role in the bildungsroman of the protagonist and only appears as a 
productive, compromising housewife in the family who everyone loves. The fight 
between Roth and his father, which Roth described as the test of his independence, is 
only given one paragraph in ‘Joe College'. None of the reasons for the fight is mentioned, 
and the emotions of the autobiographer are summarized in one line: ‘a shell-shocked son, 
freshly evacuated from the Oedipal battlefield, in dire need of rest and rehabilitation' 
(47). 
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In the light of the critics' arguments for the situation of the autobiographer, the 
contradictions and evasions could be understood in the context of writing of 
autobiography as a form of self-therapy for the author. The idealizations of his 
relationship with his family, the Jewish community and Josie could be seen as a product 
of his desire for reconciliation with his origins for self-redemption. The recovery of his 
past self requires the invention of one, and the autobiographer settles on the Jewish-
American as a comic writer and an autonomous individual at the same time. The laying 
out of one's motivations and inventions, in the scenario in The Facts, fails to neutralize 
criticism in advance and highlights the self-undermining facets of the present perspective 
of the autobiographer's. The arbitrariness of self-representation is rooted in the 
autobiographer's denial of distance between himself and his self - writing self and 
written self, past self and present self. Roth denies the split intentionality inherent in the 
autobiographical genre when he claims the autobiography is the first thing he has ever 
written 'unconsciously', and it is the voice of the written self being presented in the text. 
The scenario is dramatized as both the writing self and the written self in the 
autobiography are fictions of Philip Roth the author, who constructs his critique on this 
denial through fictions of selves. The notion that one could present one's past self in the 
writing is essentially at odds with the emphasis on the autobiographer: if the self-
representation is governed by the present standpoint and the autobiographer re-enters his 
past through this perspective, how does one ever get in touch with this past self, or one's 
self at certain point in the past? Could one feel what one did, even if mental pictures of 
the past re-surfaces, if one insists on making sense of this picture with a present 
perspective in order to build a certain self-image? It is no less problematic to assume one 
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could present the self within oneself - an interiority - as it is in a written text as the 
autobiography in The Facts, if one has a definite version of self-portrait in mind: the 
interiority is necessary a fiction when it is presented in the written text. The parody of 
such an autobiographer, who denies the distance between his present self and his past 
self, conforms to Renza's formulation of 'the confessional mode' of autobiography: the 
autobiographer intuits how his writing is a sketchy, arbitrary rendering of his life, which 
leads to a Active suspension of the writer's distance from his written ‘1，，creating the 
possibility of an alternative text to which the written version is but an oblique 'prelude' 
or indecisive 'failure' (281-91)，an issue I will explore in greater details later in this 
chapter. 
Roth's affirmation of his faithfulness to the non-fictional approach, his claim of 
appearing ‘undisguised’ in The Facts is a parody of Rousseau as much as any other 
autobiographer who gives away their insincerity instead of sincerity. The unity of life 
endorsed by the present standpoint becomes over-determined when the autobiographer is 
at pains to prove his history's consistency. One might recall Gusdorf s formulation of 
how man achieves his 'special unity and identity across time': 'to reassemble the 
scattered elements of his individual life and regroup them in a comprehensive 
sketch...[the autobiographer] strains towards a complete and coherent expression of his 
entire destiny' (Gusdorf 35). Gusdorf also claims autobiography to be 'one of the means 
to self-knowledge thanks to the fact that it recomposes and interprets a life in its totality', 
and it reveals '[my] individual unity, the mysterious essence of my being' (37). Gusdorf s 
brand of existentialism is described as ‘goselised’ by Robert Smith in Derrida and 
Autobiography, one that is ‘more or less concerned with claiming autobiography as a 
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means of consumerist "self-realisation", to which a value of truth, as wholesome 
sincerity, is often superadded' (Smith 55). Despite the vaguely political tone of his 
language, Smith does point out how the autobiographical genre is laden with an 
insistence on the text as a means to unity of self, which in turn produces the need to 
defend the subjective truth being presented. As the need for consistency - or the paranoia 
over inconsistency — becomes overtly obvious, readers spots signs of the 
autobiographer's insecurity. In the parody in The Facts, one only sees the arbitrary 
coherence of the life story. Once the unity of self - between past and present, writing 
persona and the written self - is the most important criterion, the 'true' self of the 
autobiographer is nowhere to be seen. 
The synthesis between self and the world, as I suggested in the introduction of 
this thesis, is a part of the critics' conception of the truth of self and its unity. In the 
words of Pascal's, the unity of life and self rests on the assumption that 'one could feel 
content if one could feel one's self to be consistent, to have developed naturally and 
organically, to have remained "true to itself" (viii). The demand for consistency, 
however, is essentially contradictory to the conception of life or self as a process of 
unfolding - one must stop the process and choose an arbitrary standpoint for the 
personality portrait, whose consistency is supposed to symbolize the unity of self. The 
chosen version, conditioned by the present standpoint, is necessarily one-sided and 
contradicts the implication that one is constantly developing and changing, in the process 
of self unfolding. The paradox may suggest that such unity is a necessary illusion, though 
it is an unobtainable ideal as much as a synthesis between self and the world in Pascal's 
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formulations. While Weintraub conceives the ideal relationship between individual and 
the world along the line of self versus personality ideals - the two being mutually inter-
active and formative - it is equally difficult to see how one could achieve this balance in 
an autobiographical narrative, especially as it is considered to be reached in Goethe's 
autobiography and became impossible ever since. The self-parody in The Facts 
undermines the ideal relationship between individual and personality models Weintraub 
proposes, as the demand for consistency pressures the autobiographer into conforming to 
types in his representation of himself and others. The portraits of Roth and his others in 
The Facts, as they are expected to be distinctive individuals and representatives of the 
time they lived in, are devoid of individualities. The consistency of these types and 
models becomes camouflage for the truth the autobiographer refuses to disclose, in the 
same way as his hiding behind the consistency of his identity in the text. The idea of self 
coming into being through its interplay with the world again becomes camouflage for 
motives one attempts to hide, as what happens in the world is used to explain what 
happens within the individual. 
In the same vein as his rationalization of the liaison with Josie, Roth opens the last 
chapter of The Facts, 'Now Vee May Perhaps to Begin', with a description of his next 
significant partner, May. May was a gentile woman 'at the other end of the American 
spectrum of Josie' and in each, ‘inborn character proclivities appeared to have been 
carried to a stereotypical extreme by something innately disabling in their social origins' 
(132). Roth was drawn to them because 'they were intriguingly estranged from the very 
strata of American society of which they were each distinctively emblazoned offspring 
(132-3). It echoes Roth's account of his temperament, as a writer who favors dramatic 
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juxtapositions and coupling of opposite perspectives. The turbulence of the sixties in 
America paints the background of the development of Roth's relationship with May and 
Roth's maturity as a writer. The opposition against the Vietnam War 'activated the 
fantastical style of obscene satire that began to challenge virtually every hallowed rule of 
social propriety' in the sixties, which Roth would develop in his novel Portnoy 's 
Complaint, a book whose subject matter Roth deems distinctively his (137). May 
changed from an utterly placid woman into an anti-war activist, and her nudity developed 
'a power and effective of its own' (140). Their different generic markings gave their 
relationship ‘a pervasive anthropological dimension' that 'delineated just the sort of tribal 
difference that would empower Portnoy's manic self-presentation' (137). The 
relationship between self and the world is markedly interactive, but the autobiographer 
seems far off from being an independent-minded individual, if his attraction to her was 
triggered and altered by her social and generic origins. The truth about their relationship 
is concealed in the same manner at the end of the autobiography, a concealment that 
appears strained and pushes the autobiographer to arrive at an abrupt ending. At the 
moments of success Roth wondered why he was 'trying vainly to have a good time' 
while 'the turbulence of the American sixties', which had enlivened his fiction and his 
life, 'looked finally to be boiling over' (158). This restlessness led to his weariness of 
'the loving loyalty of May Aldridge' and his determination to be ‘an absolutely 
independent, self-sufficient man’，to be the adventurous, buoyant young man who once 
handily picked up a divorcee 'who'd looked nothing so much as the Ail-American girl, 
albeit one enticingly at odds with her origins' (160) at the end of the autobiography. 
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One is hard pressed to understand how this five-year relationship, previously the 
means to regeneration, became mere nuisance to Roth because of hints of changes in the 
American society; or how his agitation prompted him to return to a self he had struggled 
so hard to shake off throughout the years. Although the autobiography has shown Roth's 
history in stages, each seemingly developing from the previous one, as a reader I do not 
see how the autobiographer has developed if he returns to the previous self that has been 
proven destructive. The only consistency that is grounded in the text is, in fact, that of the 
autobiographer's efforts in shaping his self-image according to the formula of personality 
he has devised for himself: a Jewish writer who has a taste for dramatic juxtapositions, 
who is also self-reliant, American hero who lives at the heart of the culture's 
heterogeneity. The unity of self in the text proves self-undermining: its presence shows 
the readers how it is a construct that can become over-determined as the autobiographer 
resorts to self-deception, and in turns attempts to deceive his readers. According to the 
critics' notion of subjective truth 一 the truth of man, the truth of self - such deliberate 
deception might be considered the truth about the autobiographer in relation to his 
present identity. One could only accept this notion as an explanation for Roth's self-
representation, if one considers the essence of his self to be deceit - the urge in deceiving 
readers and most importantly, himself. An alternative possibility would be the 
autobiographer has no individuality and his self is so shallow that he could not see it 
himself, that he could only resort to stereotypes for 'self-representation'. At any rate，one 
could hardly argue for the autobiographer being genuine or the autobiography being a 
genuine expression of the self of the autobiographer, and the possibility of self-defense 
for Roth is eliminated in the paratext. 
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The paratext in The Facts would be the alternative text to the written version, in 
Renza's conception, though in The Facts this alternative text is not privileged as the 
official version of truth, but has the same status as the written text in the autobiography, 
both of them being counter-texts to each other. The counter-text is an extended discussion 
of the nature of self-invention in writing, and an argument for realization of self through 
the creation of alternative existences. The idea of counter-texts is central to The Facts, 
since the truth of the author is speculated in the interaction of the autobiographer's text 
and his alter-ego's reading, each being possible version of truth. The interplay of these 
counter-texts is a continuation of themes of Roth's previous novel, The Counterlife, an 
imitation of and mediation on autobiography, of the self writing about itself as creation of 
alternate existences in writing (Shostak 207). The process is summarized in the following 
lines by Zuckerman from the novel, which make the epigraph to The Facts'. ‘And as he 
spoke I was thinking, the kind of stories that people turn life into, the kind of lives that 
people turn into' {The Counterlife 111, emphasis original). The Facts ends with 
Zuckerman's reply, and readers are tempted to believe Zuckerman's speculations as the 
truth in the autobiography, as if the counter-self is disclosing the autobiographer's 
secrets. Zuckerman's discussion of The Facts provides the oppositional reading that is 
unavailable in a conventional autobiographical text, and this paratext challenges the 
validity of Roth's self-proclaimed, 'faithful' accounts of the facts. Zuckerman details the 
presuppositions he has of autobiography - how an autobiographer cannot tell anything 
discreet, and is judged morally and ethnically, by the proximity of his narration to the 
truth - and concludes Roth is 'far better off writing about Zuckerman than 'accurately' 
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reporting his own life (161). He supports his argument by outlining the pattern of life 
story in the autobiography, to show how Roth has deliberately shaped his written self 
along the line of his Jewish-American identity, the 'terrific upheaval of the involvement 
with Josie', and his response to the larger world, culminating in the turbulence of the 
sixties in New York, particularly the outcry against the Vietnam War (164-5). In response 
to the apparent contradictions and gaps between these stages of Roth's history, 
Zuckerman perceives the real shaping force in Roth's life to be self-destruction, a 
psychological mechanism that is given no weight in the autobiography. The tendency to 
sabotage, as aforementioned, is a product of Roth's hatred for the Jewish community he 
grew up in, which Roth does not talk about in his life story. 
Convincing as it sounds, Zuckerman's reading is not any more valid than Roth's 
autobiographical expression, since it is governed by the same demand for unity of self 
and consistency in the personality portrait. Zuckerman does not allow for discontinuities 
of self in the autobiography any more than Roth, who might even claim greater authority 
over his self-representation. Zuckerman's critique undercuts its own basis, since it 
imposes another pattern on Roth's history that is shaped by an equally arbitrary 
standpoint, conditioned by pre-conceived ideas about who Roth is and is not. He is 
convinced there is something about his childhood Roth has hidden from his readers, since 
he does not believe the 'warm, comforting home' portrayed in The Facts to be the home 
that nurtured the author of Portnoy's Complaint, a novel misread by many Jews to be a 
thinly disguised, obscene autobiography (165). The drama, tension and powerful 
narration in Roth's novels are taken to be real expressions of the author's self. 
Zuckerman succumbs to the temptation of confusing novelistic contrivance with 
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autobiographical facts of an author, which makes Zuckerman's reading a misreading. It is 
doubly ironic since Zuckerman is a Jewish writers who suffers a similar but more drastic 
fate, notably his being denounced by his father in the latter's deathbed. Zuckerman may 
very well have projected himself onto Roth the way he claims Roth has projected himself 
onto Zuckerman, and his reading is a coded self-representation. He is also undermining 
his existence as an autonomous character in his fictional universe, as he asserts he is the 
self in which Roth impersonates best. Zuckerman's assertion might have, however, come 
from a need for safeguarding his existence in fictions. He admits to being envious and 
furious as he realizes the family feud he suffers has never happened to Roth, that it 
'stemmed solely from the requirements of a novel' that is not even his own (163). As he 
decides the loving family Roth comes from ‘does not produces artists as much as it 
produces dentists and accountants', Zuckerman immediately defends himself against any 
possible charges of ‘the disowned son embittered permanently by his deprivation' (162). 
Despite his disclaimer, one could see how Zuckerman is trying to consolidate his self -
and possibly his coded self-representation - by equating misery with artistic inspirations. 
Zuckerman also tries, in another attempt to justify his identity, to convince Roth not to 
‘cfe-imagine，his life or portray himself as the ‘ "good" boy，since it would give his 
Jewish seniors the satisfaction they have wanted for three decades, and Roth's success as 
a fiction writer lies in his 'having tricked' his readers into misunderstanding him (166-7， 
emphasis original). Zuckerman concludes one could not admit into autobiography 'the 
inadmissable' and says to Roth: 'Your medium for the really merciless self-evisceration, 
your medium for genuine self-confrontation, is me，(185). 
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If readers could not trust Roth's life story in The Facts, neither could they 
consider Zuckerman's version as any more valid since it is necessitated by his anxiety 
over his existence. His elaborated persuasion is grounded in the awareness of his 
existence being a product of Roth's creation. He is also engaged in the autobiographical 
enterprise of self-redemption, arguing against the possible demise of his self in Roth's 
works'". Roth's return to fiction towards the end of The Facts seems to authorize 
Zuckerman's reading over Roth's self-representation, as Zuckerman again becomes 
Roth's front man in the paratext. One could argue for the opposite interpretation, 
however, as Roth may have recovered from his fiction fatigue through the writing of 
autobiography^. Both of them, despite their status as possible versions of truth, are 
constructs that highlight the theme of self as creation of alternate existences. Zuckerman 
is the tool for such creation years before the publication of the Zuckerman novels, when 
he made his first appearance in Roth's 1974 novel My Life as a Man. My Life as a Man is 
an ostensible collection of autobiographical writings by Peter Tamopol which begins 
with the stories 'Salad Days' and 'Courting Disaster'. Tamopol admittedly impersonates 
himself in Nathan Zuckerman as he recounts his growing up in Jewish neighborhood and 
his disastrous marriage, but his failure in exorcising the past leads to the writing of 'My 
True Story'. At the beginning of the narrative is a foreword written by Tamopol himself: 
‘Presently Mr. Tamopol is preparing to forsake the art of fiction for a while 
embark upon an autobiographical narrative, an endeavor which he approaches 
warily, uncertain as to both its advisability and usefulness. Not only would the 
publication of such a personal document raise serious and legal problems, but 
there is no reason to believe that by keeping his imagination at bay and rigorously 
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adhering to the facts, Mr. Tamopol will have his obsession [with ex-wife 
Maureen] once and for all. It remains to be seen whether his candor, such as it is, 
can serve any better than his art...to demystify the past and mitigate his 
admittedly uncommendable sense of defeat {My Life as a Man 110-1) 
Given the striking parallels between the authorial statements and some of the 
content between two books, notably the romantic affairs and martial ordeal, readers are 
tempted to fill in the gaps in the psychological unity in The Facts with details from the 
novel. Roth seems to invite such reading as he admits the novel was written as an attempt 
to exorcise his hatred of his ex-wife, though the difficulty of writing it proved the book to 
be her revenge on him instead of his on her {The Facts 152). In his article '"Why Not 
Tell the Truth?': the Autobiographies of Three Fiction Writers', Peter J. Bailey concludes 
Philip Roth opts for an identical cure in his autobiography as the one in his novel, a relief 
from the sense of defeat (Bailey 220). I am unconvinced by his reading, and rather 
consider the most important parallel to be the presence of Zuckerman as the self-
proclaimed alter-ego of both Roth's and Tamopol's. Both works are parodies of an 
autobiographer who impersonates and wrestles with his shadow，though The Facts is 
explicitly contextualized in Philip Roth's life and My Life as a Man is not. True to the 
Roth's fictional oeuvre, The Facts is another example of the foreground of self as 
narrative invention, and another installment of the alternate selves and lives from The 
Counterlife. In the last chapter of the novel, Maria, the English wife of Zuckerman's, 
leaves Zuckerman and the book after a misunderstanding over anti-Semitism gets blown 
out of proportion. The conflict is resolved in The Facts, though quickly resumed as the 
couple discusses Roth's autobiography. Maria's reading focuses on the 'Jewish stuff and 
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rationalization in the narrative, which makes the counter-text to the autobiography as well 
as to Zuckerman's reading {The Facts 188). Zuckerman is again exposed to be the 
novelist who dramatizes and rationalizes, as he tries to convince Maria how the 
Zuckerman's fictions are more truthful expressions of Roth: only behind the mask of 
their fictions can Roth be truly free, which makes them - the two fictional characters 一 
more 'interesting' {The Facts 192). Zuckerman is the counter-self to Roth as much as 
Maria is to Zuckerman, since she is Zuckerman's creation from The Counterlife. In this 
series of speculative narratives, all selves are narrative invention. In his farewell letter to 
Maria, Zuckerman gives a deconstructive critique of the Western conception of the 
essential self: 
Being Zuckerman is one long performance and the very opposite of what is 
thought of as being oneself. In fact, those who most seem to be themselves appear 
to me people impersonating what they think they might like to be... 
...what I am describing, people divided in themselves, is said to 
characterize mental illness...The whole Western idea of mental health runs in 
precisely the opposite direction: what is desirable is congruity between your self-
consciousness and your natural being. But there are those whose sanity flows 
from the conscious separation of those two things. If there even is a natural being, 
an irreducible self, it is rather small, I think, and may even be the root of all 
impersonation~the natural being may be the skill itself, the innate capacity to 
impersonate. 
Wong 37 
There is no you, Maria, any more than there's a me...in the absence of a 
self, one impersonates selves, and after a while impersonates best the self that best 
gets one through... {The Counterlife 319-30, emphasis original) 
The creation of counter-texts and alternate existences is to dramatize the fact that 
'life does not necessarily have a course, a simple sequence, a predictable pattern' ('An 
Interview with Philip Roth' 12). The coherent shaping of a life in any autobiographical 
text is illusory, and the only unity in The Facts is the idea of counter-lives, the re-creation 
of one's life in alternative narratives. 
The Facts is an anti-autobiography in the sense that it challenges and destabilizes 
several pre-suppositions of the genre with a mock autobiography of the author, who does 
not actually claim the text as a true document of his life or a representation of his self. 
The self of Philip Roth, if it exists as an intrinsic entity within the writer, is realized 
through the novelist's urge of multiplying his self in his impersonations. If each of these 
fictive selves offer us glimpses into the self of Philip Roth, such self is split, multiple and 
contradictory. The truth of the autobiographical self remains uncertain, as Roth denies the 
possibility of any ultimate version of self in any of his works. The only certainty about 
the truth of Philip Roth is his novelist's urge of creating alternative existences, which 
provides the ground for the unity of his various selves in his fictions. The unity is, 
however, uncertain as Philip Roth forever hides behind the mask of the writer. 
The demand for unity, as a part of the contextualization of autobiography in 
individualism, is potentially stifling for the autobiographer whose purpose in writing is to 
present one's self. The fictions of selves, as I have shown in this chapter, are effectively 
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used by Philip Roth to explore the pressure an autobiographer is under and the deceit one 
could potentially commit as a part of one's self-assertion. The relationship between self 
and the world weighs in the favor of the former, as the self attempts to disguise the 
contradictions within itself in the autobiographical narrative. The same ego-centricism is 
the target of parody and satire in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, in which Milan 
Kundera constructs the fictions of selves as cultural criticism on the abuse of the 
autobiographical genre in the contemporary society. The notion of subjective truth is 
exploited as an obsessive emphasis on one's interiority, a complete collapse of distance 
between oneself and his/her self. The demand for unity again leads to the concealment 
instead of revelation - or even the demise - of the self. The intersection between the 
author's self and his others' underscores the nature of self as multiple, since all selves are 
partially constructed by others. The unity of self is replaced by the unity of the author and 




Fictions of Selves/Selves as Fictions 
In his direct statements about the form and content of The Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting, Milan Kundera writes: 
This book is a novel in the form of variations. The various parts follow 
each other like the various stages of a voyage leading into the interior of a theme, 
the interior of a thought, the interior of a single, unique situation, the 
understanding of which recedes from my sight into the distance. 
It is a novel about Tamina, and whenever Tamina goes offstage, it is a 
novel for Tamina. She is its principal character and its principal audience, and all 
the other stories are variations on her own story and meet with her life as in a 
mirror. 
It is a novel about laughter and about forgetting, about forgetting and 
about Prague, about Prague and about the angels (Kundera 227) 
One possible reading of the novel rendered by Kundera's statements is the novel 
as a series of variations on the theme of autobiography (Richards 221). The fiction of 
Tamina and its variations revolve around the theme of forgetting, which embodies the 
characters' attempts in maintaining his/her subjective reality or preserving his/her 
interiority. The privileging of subjective truth, as I argued in Chapter One, is essentially a 
modified view of earlier critics' notion of truth of man and is partly a defense for unity of 
self. It is also a part of the contextualization of autobiography in individualism, as truth is 
deemed an intrinsic value of individual expression. In The Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting, Kundera parodies the abuse of autobiographical genre as a result of an overt 
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emphasis on the value of interiority and individual expression. The interiority of the 
individual undermines rather than consolidates itself in the text, when the distance 
between oneself and one's self is eliminated. Subjective truth becomes the pretext under 
which one writes and rewrites the fictions of one's life, as parts of the past are obliterated 
in the name of upholding one's present identity. The demand for unity is not limited to 
unity of self across time, but includes unity of oneself with his/her self and unity of others 
with oneself in a totally ego-centric universe. With the alternation of genres — fiction, 
essay, historical facts, elements of fantasy, autobiographical anecdotes - Kundera 
illustrates how the same desire for self-glorification governs autobiographical acts in 
different situations, and how the demand for unity contributes to the demise of self 
instead of its preservation. The autobiographical strategy of Kundera poses a marked 
contrast to the single-voiced narration he parodies: in the autobiographical universe of 
Kundera, the boundary between self and others is invalidated as all selves -
autobiographical, fictional, historical, fantastical - are constituents of the same universe. 
The autobiographical self is split and multiple, as details of Kundera's life become 
elements of the stories of other selves. The invention of autobiographical self is seen in a 
new light: fictions of selves bring not the unity of self of the autobiographer, but unity 
between the characters and their creators. The concept of fictions of selves has its ground 
in the mission of the novel: to keep man's 'world of life' under a permanent light, and to 
protect human from 'the forgetting of being' (The Art of the Novel 17). 
An assumption of the contextualization of autobiography in individualism, in 
Weintraub's formulations, is that the genre embraces man's 'successive actualizations' of 
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his potential and the 'intrinsic justification' in each style of life (xii). As I pointed out in 
Chapter One, the 'danger point of morbid self-inspection and egocentricism' Weintraub 
warns against is near at hand for any autobiographer, since one could easily indulge in 
one's uniqueness and fail to see the others and the world in the same light. In The Culture 
of Narcissism, Christopher Lasch distinguishes a necessary focus on self from morbid 
obsession with the self in contemporary autobiographical writings: 
The popularity of the confessional mode testifies...to the new narcissism 
that runs all through American culture; but the best work in this vein attempts, 
precisely through disclosure, to achieve a critical distance from the self and to 
gain insight into the historical forces reproduced in psychological form, that have 
made the very concept of selfhood increasingly problematic...Yet the increasing 
interpenetration of fiction, journalism, and autobiography undeniably indicates 
that many writers find it more and more difficult to achieve the detachment 
indispensable to art. Instead of fictionalizing personal material or otherwise 
reordering it, they have taken to presenting it undigested.. .Instead of working 
through working through their memories, many writers now rely on mere self-
disclosure to keep the reader interested, appealing not to his understanding but to 
his salacious curiosity about the private lives...Even the best confessional writers 
walk a fine line between self-analysis and self-indulgence. Their books...waver 
between hard-won personal revelation, chastened by the anguish with which it 
was gained, and the kind of spurious confession whose only claim to the reader's 
attention is that it describes events of immediate interest to the author... it allows a 
Wong 42 
lazy writer to indulge in 'the kind of immodest self-revelation which ultimately 
hides more than it admits (16-9) 
The difference between true autobiographers and their 'spurious' imitations is 
parodized in 'Lost Letter', the forth part of The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. The 
part opens with Kundera creating his heroine Tamina，the 'experimental self through 
which he constructs his critique of the autobiographical culture he terms graphomania 
{The Art of Novel 34). Fictions and essays illuminate each other throughout Part Four, 
with the author commenting on the abuse of the autobiographical genre from different 
perspectives. A Czech widow who serves coffee in a small cafe in Paris, Tamina is 
popular among all her customers since they all talk to her about themselves and she never 
offers any resistance. Tamina lives in a world in which everyone wants to outtalk one 
another, which Kundera describes as ‘a battle to seize the ear of others' (110). The 
scenario is exemplified in section eight, in which the fictional characters Bibi and Banaka 
talk about capturing their perception of the world in writing and pretend to echo each 
other's thoughts. Banaka announces their life in the world no longer matters because ‘[it] 
has been interiorized', and the uniqueness of their inner world would suffice (125). Bibi 
describes her need to write as a direct outcome of her self-awareness, about how her 
'whole body is filled with the desire to express itself and she knows her feelings to be 
absolutely unique and original (125). The theme of graphomania is elaborated in the next 
section when Kundera recounts his meeting with a taxi driver, who swam three days and 
three nights for survival during the war，and writes about his experience during his 
chronic insomnia because he believes ‘it could help a lot of people' (126). The real 
reason for writing, as Kundera points out, is one's self-defense against the lack of 
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attention from one's loved ones. The autobiographical mode shifts to the essayist as 
Kundera defines graphomania as ‘a desire to write books (to have a public of unknown 
readers)', and points out '[the] mainspring that drives one to write is necessarily an 
absence of vital content, that void within the individual in the age of isolation' (127). The 
proliferation of graphomania is unstoppable, since ‘everyone is pained by the thought of 
disappearing, unheard and unseen, into an indifferent universe'; and when everyone turns 
himself 'into a universe of words', ‘the age of universal deafness and incomprehension 
will have arrived' (147). 
Graphomania may be a contemporary phenomenon according to Kundera's 
definitions, but one could see its roots in the notion of autobiography as manifestation of 
individuality. The caricatures of Bibi and Banaka remind one of how self-awareness is 
often seen as synonymous with self-assertion in earlier autobiographical criticism, which 
entails an assertion of centrality of self by viewing the world as an 'emanation' from the 
self (Marcus 151). Bibi's proclamation of her need for self-expression suggests the desire 
for unity of oneself with his/her self, and such desires could eliminate the distance one 
must take from oneself in an autobiographical enterprise and reduce autobiography into a 
bitter monologue. The privileging of interiority, originally a defense for subjective truth 
in the autobiographical genre, takes on the form of narcissism and contributes to the 
'spurious' imitations of autobiography Lasch criticizes. The proliferation of such 
autobiographical writings is parodied in the episode of Bibi and her friends watching 
television at her place in section thirteen, with Tamina as an observer and ridiculer of the 
graphomaniacs. In a TV program where a popular journalist converses with the authors of 
the books published the week before, one of the authors describes the 'shocking erotic 
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confessions' in his memoirs as 'very exact arithmetic': ‘a total of six hours and fifty-six 
minutes of orgasm' in his life (135). The objectification of intimate details of one's life is 
joined by the audience: as the author talks about his first orgasm in Rourou, Joujou talks 
about her own orgasm and soon Bibi and DeDe Joujou are discussing the orgasm of 
someone called Tanaka. None of them listens to anyone else and insists on talking 
aggressively, as if others are non-existent. One does not strengthen one's uniqueness of 
one's self as much as reduce it by exposing one's private experiences, since it is precisely 
this privateness that distinguishes one's experience from someone else's. As Pascal 
Bruckner puts it in his discussion of proliferation of autobiographical writings in France 
since the 1970's, the subjectivity in these writings in unparalleled that they all end up 
resembling each other, as if written by the same person. The publication of such writings 
becomes an isolating activity, which contradicts its intended universality. As each text is 
a fanatical celebration of the writer's uniqueness or his interiority, it repels his readers 
and contributes to the further isolation of each individual (31). 
Kundera's fictions could be read as cultural criticism on the mobilization of 
graphomania aided by mass media: as literature falls more and more into the hands of 
mass media, the audience witnesses the same simplifications and stereotypes day after 
day. One sees similar scenarios throughout the novels, in which the forgetting of being is 
seen to be rooted in one's desire for unity of oneself with his/her self and for 
distinguishing one's individuality. In an ironic passage in Part Three, 'The Angels', 
Kundera pinpoints how one falls prey into the manipulation of media and political party 
as they exploit ‘the expression of being rejoicing in being': 
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You certainly remember this scene from dozens of bad films: a boy and a 
girl are running hand in hand in a beautiful spring (or summer) landscape...By 
laughing the two runners are proclaiming to the whole world... "We're happy, 
we're glad to be in the world, we're in agreement with being!" It's a silly 
scene.. .but it expresses a basic human attitude... 
All churches, all underwear manufacturers, all generals, all political 
parties, are in agreement about that kind of laughter, and all of them rush to put 
the image of the two laughter runners on the billboards advertising their religion, 
their products, their ideology, their nation, their sex, their dishwashing powder 
(81). 
The passage is echoed in Part Six, also titled 'The Angels', where Kundera discusses how 
Czech people became victims to organized forgetting by the Communist Party. In the age 
of amnesia, the world is dominated by stereotyped harmonies, banal melodies and 
monotonous rhythms, but they appeal to the mass since everyone can 'fraternize by 
means of these simple combinations of tones', and there is ‘no more boisterous, no more 
unanimous agreement with that than the agreement with being' (248). As graphomaniacs 
contribute to the forgetting of their beings by the autobiographical writings, human 
beings in general contribute to the same forgetting as they succumb to the desire for self-
assertion. The obliteration of individuality by mass media is again parodized in the 
fictions in Part Seven, 'The Border'. The Clevis family represents individuals who 
modify their views on current debates according to ideas that are deemed 'progressive' 
(273). In an essayist passage within the fictions, Kundera writes: 
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The best progressive ideas are those that include a strong enough dose of 
provocation to make its supporters feel proud of being original, but at the same 
time attract so many adherents that the risk of being an isolated exception is 
immediately averted by the noisy approval of a triumphant crowd...and the 
satisfaction of seeing their thoroughly nonconformist position suddenly become 
everyone's position (273-4). 
The autobiographies of individuals like Clevis, from this perspective, are written by the 
on-going trends of contemporary society and all resemble one another in a similar 
manner as the graphomaniacs' writings. The demand for unity of oneself with his/her 
self, in this context, leads to the kind of empty self-assertion that contains no value as 
individual expression. 
The difficulties in preserving one's interiority in such a contemporary society are 
explored through Kundera's invention of Tamina, the character who is constantly 
surrounded and gradually overwhelmed by graphomaniacs in Part Four. Tamina's 
present, as an exile and a widow, consists of serving coffee, offering her ears to 
graphomaniacs and holding onto the memories of her past. In her waking hours Tamina is 
a victim to graphomaniacs like Bibi and her friends, in her sleep she dreams of the 
ostriches she saw at a zoo earlier. In her dream Tamina is desperate to protect the golden 
ring in her mouth, which Kundera explains is a symbol of silence and beauty he draws 
from a story by Thomas Mann. In a half fictional, half essayist section, Kundera states 
how Tamina's dream is a parable of the graphomania she suffers in her life: 
Tamina will never know what those great birds came to tell her. But I 
know...They are not interested at all in her. Each of them came to tell her about 
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itself...That it had spent its important childhood in the important village of 
Rourou. That its important orgasm had lasted six hours...That it had gone 
swimming, that it had fallen ill and then recovered ...there is nothing more than 
what they want to tell her (145). 
Throughout Part Four, Tamina is described to have resorted to live in and for silence, and 
in the memories of her husband. The task of preserving one's inner reality seems to have 
become impossible as graphomania invades one's subconscious, and Tamina's hope of 
recovery of her notebooks is devastated. Hugo, who offers to retrieve Tamina's 
notebooks from Prague, succeeds in having sex with Tamina but realizes she has been 
with him only because she wants him to go to Prague: 
Hugo is aware that the only deep feeling he is capable of is fidelity to the 
unrecognized, abandoned tower (the tower of the published article and the 
projected book about his love for Tamina), that he is capable of going to war for 
the tower and forcing Tamina to open his eyes and marvel at its height...He 
would agree to go to and from Prague a hundred times if only she would open her 
eyes a bit to the universe he wanted to take her to, the universe of his blood and 
thoughts! (158) 
The story of Tamina in Part Four ends in the image of her being silently defeated, and 
disgusted by all others. One might recall Bruckner's criticism on the writings by such 
graphomanaics, and how they narrow instead of broadens experience. The self of Hugo, 
as well as other fictive selves in ‘Lost Letters', exemplifies the abuse of the 
autobiographical genre as one borders on the morbid point of ego-centricism 
aforementioned in this chapter. The notion of autobiography as an ‘active contribution' to 
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the world, in Pascal's conception, has been totally reversed: in the age of graphomania, 
exhibitions of petty egoisms contributes to acceleration of cultural amnesia and the loss 
of individuality. 
The obliteration of individuals, apart from being a cultural phenomenon, has its 
manifestations in different variations and genres in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. 
The desire for self-glorification is psychological mechanism in all humans, and is at work 
whenever one writes and rewrites one's history, as illustrated in the intersections of 
history of Czechoslovakia and the story of Mirek in Part One, also titled 'Lost Letters'. 
The Communist Party rewrote the nation's autobiography when they removed dementis 
from the picture of their coming into power in 1948. Four years later dementis was 
charged with treason and hanged, and only his fur hat remains on Gottwald's hat in the 
photo of the historical event. Mirek, who imagines himself as the true historian of the 
nation by keeping political documents, desperately wants to retrieve the letters he wrote 
to the ugly mistress he once had before his arrest by the police. In Kundera's narration, 
Mirek，s attempt is driven by '[the] desire to extend his arm far back to the past and hit it 
with his fist. The desire to slash the painting portraying his youth' (28). The alternation 
between historical facts, fictions, and authorial comments illustrates how the revision of 
the past is universal, as Kundera puts it in a half fictional, half essayist passage: 'Mirek 
rewrote history just like the Communist Party, like all political parties, like all peoples, 
like mankind' (33). Mirek cuts a particularly ironic figure in his struggle against being 
obliterated from the Communist idyll, as he spends his last moments of freedom trying to 
obliterate Zdena out of his idyll, to make it 'perfect and beautiful' (13). The 
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autobiographical act of Mirek may seem to take place in a different situation in life from 
those of the graphomaniacs, though all of them show the same tendency in turning 
autobiography into a monologic universe, in which both the relationships between oneself 
and one's self, between self and the world collapse. The graphomanaics are surrounded 
by their own words as by ‘a wall of mirrors, which allows no voice to filter outside' 
(128). Mirek considers the world's space as 'merely an obstacle slowing down his 
activity' and fantasizes a glorious end in the prison that is 'entirely surrounded by walls', 
'a splendidly illuminated scene of history' against which he paints his image as the heroic 
outcast (31，33). 
This solipsistic tendency is a product of the privileging of subjective reality, and 
Mirek is an autobiographer who constantly revises the fictions of his self according to his 
present needs. The truth of the autobiographer at the present moment has been an 
important defense for the unity of self, as well as the referential or truth value of 
autobiography as a genre. The story of Mirek, however, makes it difficult to defend the 
fictions of self in this context. Throughout his youth, Mirek told different stories about 
himself and lied about his liaison with Zdena in all kinds of occasions later on. Unwanted 
memories - those who reminded of his weakness as a young man - are totally forgotten, 
and gave way to self-satisfaction and self-praise. Earlier identities - the weak young man 
who did love an ugly girl，the idealistic 'comrade' who put blisters on his buttocks and 
uttered extreme opinions at meetings - are to be crossed out in order to maintain Mirek's 
present identity as the outcast of the Communist idyll till the end. Mirek imagines his life 
story coming to a glorious end when he will end up in prison: 
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Mirek could not imagine a better ending for the novel of his life. They 
wanted to efface hundreds of thousands of lives from memory and leave nothing 
but an unstained idyll. But Mirek is going to land his whole body on that idyll, 
like a stain. He'll stay there just as dementis's hat stayed on Gottwald's head 
(33). 
One may recall Gusdorf s conception of autobiography as the means to self-redemption 
and revenge on history, and the unity of his identity across time may be important for 
Mirek when there is no more chance to change his life. The use of fictions in 
autobiographical enterprise, in Mirek’ s case, does not show the autobiographer 
'according to our best lights' so much as expose his hypocrisy (Fyre 151). The revision of 
his imaginary life narrative shows the same disregard for others' individuality as the 
Communist Party's revision of the nation's history, as Mirek proclaims to be defending 
his individuality against the Communist idyll. The truth of Mirek's self - at any moment 
in history, as Kundera shows in the fictions in 'Lost Letters' - are only ‘legends and lies' 
(24). Each of the successive selves Mirek invents in his life - the lover who feigned 
passion over his partner's body, or the climber who did not care how ugly a powerful 
woman was — are only evasions of truth. As I argued in my discussion of the fictions of 
self/self as fiction in Chapter One, autobiography as existential fiction may offer the site 
of negotiation for the autobiographer's psychological reality, but such notion could be 
easily exploited. The fictions Mirek constructs of himself, contrary to what Eakin's 
conception of the use of fictions in autobiography, cannot be understood as the truth of 
his self unless one sees his self as a lie. The negotiation we witness is one of self-
deception, and the conflicting only come together at the end of the story, if one accept his 
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final self-image as the final installment of his deceit, of concealment of his lies. The unity 
of self is indeed a fulfillment of one's wish to abridge the gap between past and present, 
though it pinpoints discontinuities more than establish continuity between these selves for 
the readers of the novel. The demand for unity also proves to be destructive for the 
autobiographer, since Mirek's story comes to an end as he tries cross out his earlier 
identities to maintain his present one. 
In Understanding Milan Kundera: Public Events, Private Affairs, Fred Misurella 
raises the questions of self in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting: What is the self? 
What importance can it have, being so fragile as to be erased not only from physical life 
but memory as well? (23). Kundera has pointed out that to understand the self in his 
novels is to 'grasp the essence of its existential problem...Getting to the bottom of the 
situations, the motifs, even the words that shape him' (Salmon 'Conversation with Milan 
Kundera and on the Art of the Novel 73-75). The keywords for Kundera's self in the 
novel, as its title suggests, are laughter and forgetting. The fictions of the author, devoted 
to the two themes, provide the two structural climaxes in the novel where all genres come 
to a polyphony in the autobiographical. Kundera thus grasps his self in the 
autobiographical narratives in a similar manner as he grasps the selves of his characters. 
Kundera himself was one of selves who struggle against the forces of forgetting and the 
demand for unity, as one 1 earns from his autobiography in Part Three, ‘The Angels'. The 
rapid alternation of genres in Part Three illustrates the theme of laughter and the image of 
the ring dance, and highlights the author's personal experience as the basis of his fictions 
in the novel. The fictional illuminates the autobiographical, while the autobiographical 
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reaffirms his critique and contemplation throughout the novel. The opening sections of 
Part Three are the author's discussion on laughter with the use of fictions and essay. In 
the first section, the fictional characters Michelle are Gabrielle are attempting an 
interpretation of Rhinoceros by Eugene lonesco, a play that allegorizes the collective 
fanaticism in humans that totalitarian control mobilizes and contain many parallel images 
to the images in Part Three^'. Kundera quotes Annie Leclerc's exaggerated claims about 
laughter being the 'utmost height of sensual pleasure...the expression of being rejoicing 
in being' (81). In his ironic essay in section four, Kundera defines demonic laughter 
against angelic laughter: the former denotes the absurdity of things, while the latter 
rejoices over the ordered and meaningful world of God's creation. Kundera's 
autobiography is narrated in section three, as he recounted his writing an astrology 
column for a weekly magazine which under an assumed name through the help of his 
young friend R. The autobiography is interrupted in section five, in which Kundera refers 
to a magazine photo showing a group of young people in a ring dance before their clash 
with the police, and offers his personal interpretation of the photo: 'I think I understand 
them: they have the impression that the circle they are describing on the ground is a 
magical circle uniting them like a ring. And their chests swell with an intense feeling of 
innocence: they are united...by dancing, like children (88). Madam Raphael, the teacher 
of Michelle and Gabrielle, 'clipped that photo from the magazine and gazed at it 
dreamily', for she has always wished to dance in a ring herself. Michelle and Gabrielle, 
united in their pride in their interpretation of Rhinoceros, emit the sounds that resemble 
the angel's laughter, while quotations from Annie Leclerc's essay are repeated. 
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The meaning of the variations is illuminated as they come to a polyphony 
Kundera returns to his autobiography in section six, as the young Kundera is described to 
have once shared the same desire for unity and self-glorification: 
I too once danced in a ring. It was in 1948...I took other Communist 
students by the hands or shoulders and we took: two steps in place, one step 
forward, raised the left leg to one side and then the right to the other...we always 
had something to celebrate... and on our face we had the smile of happiness. Then 
one day I said something I should not have said, was expelled from the party, and 
had to leave the ring dance. 
This is when I understood the magical meaning of the circle...Like a 
meteorite broken off from a planet, I left the circle and have not yet stopped 
falling. Some people are granted their death as they are whirling around, and 
others are smashed at the end of their fall. And these others (I am one of them) 
always retain a kind of faint yearning for that lost ring dance, because we are all 
inhabitants of a universe where everything turns in circles (92). 
The desire for unity is thus a basic human desire and contains its own poetry, which is 
captured in the scene in which Paul Eluard recites his poems about joy and brotherhood 
in Prague in June 1950，the scene which immediately follows Kundera's narration of his 
expulsion from the party. The historical and autobiographical are joined in the fictional 
and the fantastical, pushing the novel to its first structural climax. Kundera is described 
to watch the dancing of Eluard and the youngsters with envy and yearning, and as the 
'splendid wreath of bodies' glided over the city, Kundera 'realized with anguish in my 
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hear that they were flying like birds and I was falling like a stone, that they had wings 
and I would never have any’ (95). 
The autobiographical anecdotes in Part Three were not constructed to glorify the 
author's past, or to achieve unity between his past and present self. Kundera does not 
describe himself as free from the psychological mechanism he criticizes, and the 
acknowledgement between himself and others strengthens his critique and endows his 
autobiography with stronger emotional resonance. The theme of laughter is elaborated 
through the alternation of fiction and autobiography in the rest of Part Three, while one of 
the major incidents of Kundera's life - his decision to leave Czechoslovakia - is narrated 
with irony and sorrows at the same time. Demonic laughter is bom as Kundera returns to 
the story of Michelle and Gabrille, when the Jewish girl Sarah goes on stage and kicks 
the girls from behind during their presentation of Rhinoceos, The class bursts into 
laughter over the absurdity of the situation, while Madam Raphael laughs as she mistakes 
the incident as a calculated move in the presentation. The laughter turns angelic as the 
teacher and the two students are joined in their ring dance, and shortly they rise up to and 
through the ceiling, leaving the dumbfounded students on the ground, hearing 'the fading, 
radiant laughter of three archangels' (104). Kundera's fictionalization of the theme of 
laughter here is packed with a lot of irony and malice, yet the readers witness how this 
laughter is turned against Kundera in the next section when his identity as the astrology 
writer was disclosed and his friend R lost his job. As the two talked about the editor-in-
chief of the weekly magazine, who had spent three years in Moscow studying Marxism-
Leninism and had his horoscope cast by Kundera. Though thoroughly distressed, R 
laughed and for Kundera: 
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...it rang in my ears like a tentative promise of salvation. For it was just 
this laughter I wanted to hear when I wrote those silly articles on Pisces, Virgo, 
and Aries, it was just this laughter I imagined as my reward, but it never reached 
me, not from anywhere, because in the meantime throughout the world the angels 
occupied all positions of authority... (100) 
The autobiography of Kundera was determined by the world he was in at this point, since 
he understood he could no longer remain in the country. His desire to rape R, during their 
meeting, was merely a desperate effort to grab something in the midst of falling: 
Because since they expelled me from the ring dance, I have not stopped 
falling, I am still falling...farther and farther away from my country into the 
desert of a world where the fearsome laughter of the angels rings out, drowning 
all my words with its jangle. 
I know that Sarah exists somewhere. Sarah the Jewish girl, Sarah my 
sister, but where will I find her? (106). 
Sarah is the character who induces laughter in Part Three, as well as in Old 
Testament. In the book of Genesis, Abraham is the titular father of the Jews. Abraham 
and Sarah laugh at God's promise of Sarah giving birth in her old age, and the son who is 
bom is named Isaac, Hebrew for 'he laughs' or 'laughter' (Misurella 31). Part Three ends 
with Kundera's calling for the fictive self with whom he could have real unity - the 
rebellion against the monologic universe of the angels. 
The unity between Kundera and his others, as we see in Part Six, also titled 'The 
Angels', is created by the joining of autobiography and fiction and Kundera's desire to 
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understand 'the interior world of their infinitude of possibilities' in his other selves in the 
novel (227). The collapse of boundary between self and others is made possible by 
Kundera's nostalgia for his lost homeland and his past, as the yearning transforms itself 
into an 'inner intensity that abolishes the borderline between the fantastic and the real, 
muddles time' (Banjeree 143). The reversal of mental perspectives is illumined at the 
beginning of a quasi-autobiographical narrative in Part Five: 
[From] the Breton town of Rennes...! am watching them from the height 
of my lookout, but the distance is too great. Fortunately, there is a tear in my eye, 
which, like a telescope lens, brings me nearer to their faces...I see them all 
against the backdrop of the luminous Prague of fifteen years ago (176). 
The same breakdown of perspectives governs the invention of Tamina, as 
Kundera emphasizes Tamina is originally from Prague but leaves anonymous the town 
where her story takes place. As Kundera's alter-ego, the keyword for Tamina's self is 
memory - she is the central investigation of the difficulties of self-preservation, and the 
double descent to death of Tamina and Kundera's father is the author's examination of 
forgetting as both an organized and organic process. The existence of self, in The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting, depends on memory. lamina's life with her husband was 
recorded in a diary and notebooks that remain in Prague, which Tamina cherishes despite 
some of the unpleasant moments they have recorded: 
She does not want to give back to the past its poetry. She wants to give 
back to it its lost body. What is urging her on is not a desire for beauty. It is a 
desire for life. 
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For Tamina is adrift on a raft and looking back, looking only back. Her 
entire being contains only what she sees there, far behind her. Just as her past 
contracts, disintegrates, dissolves, so Tamina is shrinking and losing her contours. 
...if the tottering structure of her memories collapses like a clumsily 
pitched tent, all that Tamina will be left with is the present, the invisible point, 
that nothingness moving slowly toward death (119). 
If one of the tasks of autobiography is to preserve the past in order to give meaning to the 
present, Tamina comes closest to being a genuine autobiographer out of all the characters 
in the novel. She is, in Charles Molesworth's words, the 'embodiment of [Kundera，s] 
vision of redemptive interiority' (Molesworth 236). Unlike the graphomaniacs in Part 
Three, Tamina is aware of how her experience would cease to be hers once her notebooks 
are read by others: '[the] striking similarity that would nonetheless remain between her 
and the author of the notes would have the effect of parody, of mockery' (140). 
Kundera's narration of Tamina's thoughts reminds one of the problem of split 
intentionality in the autobiographical genre, though it is also an indirect critique on the 
ego-centricism of the graphomaniacs and characters as Mirek. Autobiographers who are 
absorbed in their selves fail to realize their writings do not exemplify their interiority, and 
the lack of awareness between their writing selves and the written selves amplify their 
self-absorption more than their significance. 
While the preservation of oneself in writing becomes increasing difficult in a 
world where the individual is constantly overwhelmed by others, one is also gradually 
defeated by the erosion of memory. The erosion of memory informs the tragedy of 
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Tamina in Part Six, which is identified with that of Kundera's father and that of 
Czechoslovakia under totalitarian rule. As Kundera writes: 
The silence of my father, from whom all words slipped away, the silence 
of the hundred forty-five historians, who have been forbidden to remember, that 
multiple silence resounding through Bohemia, forms the background of the 
picture I am painting of Tamina (221). 
The loss of memory is the beginning of the end of self in the same manner as the demand 
for unity. In Part Three, the readers witness Tamina's failure in recalling several of the 
nicknames Pavel gave her during different periods of their marriages, and thus some of 
her earlier identities or selves^". Her history is recorded in diary and notebooks, non-
fictional serial forms which allow contradictions to coexist without assimilating the 
dissonance (Nussbaum 130). The self has to be preserved in all its differences and 
contradictions, and Tamina meets her death as she gives up on retrieving her memories of 
her husband. Czechoslovakia also headed towards its possible death in Kundera's 
conception, as the self of the nation was constantly destroyed and reinvented. Part Six, 
'The Angels', again opens with the historical event of Czechoslovakia in 1948. The 
vacancy of dementis is filled by the ghost of Kafka in the opening section of Part Six, 
who Kundera calls 'the prophet of a world without memory' (217). In Kafka's novel, 
Prague is a city without memory and humans have lost continuity with their humanity: no 
one remembers anything in a city without names, or with names that are different from 
what they were yesterday; people without a name are people without a past since there is 
no link between their present and their past. The self of Czechoslovakia was re-invented 
whenever a different power seized the country: the street Tamina's family lived on went 
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through five names from the day Tamina's father was bom to the time Tamina got 
married. The loss of memory, as Ellen Pifer points out in his discussion of The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting, is also the loss of the source of individual identity. It is through 
language that we name or identify not only things but ourselves. Identity, like meaning in 
a text, arises from difference: and the ability to differentiate one word from another~or 
one thing, one event, one person, one author, one culture from another~depends on 
memory. Memory of the past, recorded as history, keeps alive our sense of differentiation 
and identity (Pifer 87-8). 
The end of self is as inevitable as forgetting, which plays the lesser twin of death. 
Another major incident of Kundera's life - the death of his father - is narrated through 
the alternation of autobiography and fiction. The diminishing self of Kundera's father is, 
like Kundera's in Part Three, the basis of the fictions of other selves. Kundera's father 
struggled against the loss of language during the last years of his life, and is described to 
ride his horse in fever for days before his death. Tamina is invited to forget her forgetting 
of her husband and their love, by a young man called Raphael. Raphael is the name of an 
angel who leads people to Lethe, the river of forgetfulness (Jones 310). Tamina embarks 
on her journey towards forgetting as she gets into a red sports car, which recalls the red 
sports car of the police who arrests Mirek. Kundera's father died when organized 
forgetting in Czechoslovakia was at its full swings, exemplified by the half 
autobiographical, half fictional episode in which Husak, who Kundera calls the President 
of Forgetting, was made an Honorary Pioneer by the children. On the children island, 
Tamina loses her name and her status as an adult as she joins all the games of the 
children. Her memory fades and she enters the realm of absolute forgetting, as she gives 
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up the privacy of her body. Her body is shared with the children, and her sexuality is 
reduced to a small toy for the production of physical pleasure. The primeval state Tamina 
regresses into is an allegory of the idiocy Czech people were lured into in the age of 
amnesia, as they fell prey to the rejoicing of 'agreement with being' aforementioned in 
this chapter (248). The loss of memory, in this context, has its root in mankind. 
Totalitarian control in Czechoslovakia is the mobilization of such desire, and the children 
island is a fantastical manifestation of the same scenario. Unity of self across time is 
guaranteed by erasing earlier identities, and also by obliterating individuals who are not 
in unison with the idyll. Tamina is haunted and abused on the children island as she stops 
joining their games and attempts to fight back. In Kundera's narration, Tamina becomes 
‘the cement of [the children's] brotherhood' and the tool of their glorifying their own 
world and its laws (255). Such ego-centricism barkens back to Mirek's autobiographical 
act, for whom the world of others is simply the stage for his self-glorification, and 
whoever does not fit into the picture could be airbrushed out of existence. Death is the 
ultimate agreement or unity one can achieve with oneself: all conflicts cease at the 
moment of death. For those who celebrate the expression of being rejoicing being, such 
as Saint Annie Leclerc (as Kundera mockingly refers to), even death 'is a part of joy' 
(80). 
The boundary between public and private is invalidated in The Book of Laughter 
and Forgetting, since the fate of one's nation is governed by the same mechanism as the 
fate of oneself. The autobiographies of the individuals are ultimately determined by the 
world they are situated in - a world in which the external determines overwhelm one's 
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internal impulses. The boundary between self and world does not exist for characters as 
Mirek and the graphomaniacs as others do not exist for them, while it collapses for 
Kundera as he incorporates his own story in those of his characters and vice versa. By 
paralleling the stories of his characters with his own, Kundera gives a strong sense of 
unity and validity to the whole: the readers can see that what did not happen is as 
revealing and in a sense, as true as what did happen (Eagle 155). The understanding of 
one self or an existential situation requires and entails the understanding of another, and 
Kundera's autobiography revolves around the loss of his beloved father's self and the 
possible end of Czechoslovakia's self. The story of Tamina provides the link between the 
two, and the agent through which Kundera explores the essence of forgetting as an 
existential situation. The interaction between self and the world is crucial to Kundera's 
autobiographical strategy, because it is the means by which he comes to terms with the 
impossibility of reaching, of preserving the infinitude within his father: 
Man knows he cannot embrace the universe with its suns and stars. Much 
more unbearable is for him to be condemned to lack the other infinitude, that 
infinitude near at hand, within reach. Tamina lacked the infinitude of her love, I 
lacked Papa, and all of us are lacking in our work because in pursuit of perfection 
we go toward the core of the matter but never quite get to it. 
That the infinitude of the exterior world escapes us we accept as natural. 
But we reproach ourselves until the end of our lives for lacking that other 
infinitude. We ponder the infinitude of the stars but are unconcerned about the 
infinitude our papa has within him. 
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It is not surprising that in his later years variations became the favorite 
forms for Beethoven, who knew all too well (as Tamina and I know) that there is 
nothing more unbearable than lacking the being we loved, those sixteen measures 
and the interior world of their infinitude of possibilities (226-7). 
The use of variations, as the form of the novel, represents Kundera's attempt to 
understand the self of his father, which the son never reached when the father was alive. 
During his last years Kundera's father worked on Beethoven's sonatas and attempting to 
understand the meaning behind the use of variations. Kundera never managed to retrieve 
the answer from the 'wordless infinitude' in his father's speech, who lost all power of 
speech towards the end of his life (220). His self-reproaches, as Kundera states in section 
seven, are parallels to Tamina，s over her forgetting of her husband. The self continue to 
slip away from those who struggle to reach it - Pavel's from Tamina, Kundera's father's 
for Kundera. One could only continue to search for the self in all possible spheres, and 
only memory would keep it alive. Memories of love come back to Tamina before she 
starts her journey to the children island. Although Tamina realizes her husband is still 
alive in her sadness and she must search for him all over the world, both Pavel's and 
Tamina's self diminish once she descends into the realm of forgetting. Kundera's father's 
self is forever gone from Kundera, who could continue to grasp it through writing. One 
way of grasping the self of his father, for Kundera, is to explore variation form as the 
voyage to the ‘infinite diversity of the interior world lying hidden in all things' (226). The 
son and the father are joined in their understanding of the form, which forms a part of the 
construction of Kundera's self in the novel. The boundary between past and present, 
between autobiographical and fictional, between historical and fantastical is again 
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abolished by the inner intensity of Kundera, as the novel comes to its second structural 
climax near the end of Part Six. In a quasi-autobiographical narrative, Kundera recounts 
the scene of his father dying for the last time in the novel. He could still hear Husak's 
words coming to him 'through the flowering apple trees' from eight years ago, and his 
words consist of quotations from Annie Leclerc's essay on laughter being the expression 
of rejoicing of being in being (256). Sunny smiles of the children are refracted in Husak's 
tears of emotions, which creates a great miracle of a rainbow over Prague. Fiction brings 
Kundera in contact not only with his past self, but with his father's and the self of 
Czechoslovakia. The forgetting of being is temporarily postponed as Kundera recaptures 
the moment when forgetting as manifests itself in both the realms of the individual and 
the world as an existential situation. The preservation of selves has its ground in the 
novelist's creation of a textual universe comprised by different genres, breaking the 
boundary between the infinitude of the exterior and that of the interior. 
The success of the invention of selves, in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, 
rests in Kundera's concern for both interiority and variety of the self. The story of 
autobiographer is told in relation to his fictive others, and the autobiographical is 
illumined through the fictions of other selves in the novel. The synthesis between self and 
the world is achieved by the creation of a textual universe inhibited by all selves, as the 
self and others share the same experience. The understanding of self comes from the 
understanding of the world, and on establishing the connections between the two. The 
same dialectic governs The Invention of Solitude, in which the stories about oneself and 
others convey the same truth about the autobiographer. The memoir is an inter-text of all 
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texts that have become a part of the subjectivity of the author, while the self and the 
world come into a synthesis as individual and collective consciousness merge in one's 
memories. The fictions of selves are endowed with the power of establishing human 
kinship, as one speaks of oneself as another in one's story or lets one's story speak 
through the stories of others. The key to self-understanding and self-revelation is thus je 
est un autre. 
Wong 65 
Chapter Four 
Self as Others/Je est un autre 
The presentation of self - the interiority of the writer or a character - is achieved 
through the use of multiple selves in the autobiographical fictions I have discussed in the 
last chapters. This interiority is often inaccessible to the writer because the self, as I put it 
in my discussion on The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, forever slips away from those 
who want to reach it. One is also deceived by the illusion of proximity: one believes one 
understands his/her self at moments of self-absorption, in the same way one fails to look 
into the self of one's beloved at moments of intimacy. The understanding of self is 
essentially an impossible task, as one could not see all facets of self at the same time, 
while self is a continual unfolding at a pace beyond one's keeping, and the only certainty 
about the self - and life - is death. 
In The Invention of Solitude, Paul Auster depicts the search for a father whose self 
is inaccessible both in life and in death, and the search of his own self in the connections 
between his own self and other selves in the memoir. In the first part, 'Portrait of an 
Invisible Man', the knowledge of self could only be traced in fragmentation. When unity 
of self is an impossibility, the subject of the auto/biographical project unfolds as a series 
of contradictions, and the essence of self remains incommunicable. The second part, 'The 
Book of Memory', constructs a self that comes into being through its collusions with the 
others, while the text itself is a collaborative effort of Auster and the other selves in the 
narrative. The various selves - autobiographical, fictional, historical, biblical - share the 
same solitary consciousness Auster creates and re-creates in his memoirs. The notion of 
je est un autre is elaborated in Auster's autobiography, in which the self-scrutiny 
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depends on the distance between the writing persona and the written self. It is also 
manifested in his use of 'mirror texts': the fictions of oneself is told through the fictions 
of others, as the parallels between the two illuminate the creative process of the memoir. 
The selves in both parts are constructed to pinpoint the relationality of self, and the idea 
that the self is essentially a composite, an inter-subjectivity of all others that constitute it. 
The examination of one's self leads to one's immersion in the world, and the 
autobiographical narrative transcends its limit as a single-voiced discourse, affirming the 
significance of writing about the self. 
The nature of referentiality of 'Portrait of an Invisible Man' distinguishes its form 
as fictional biographical, since details are 'arranged within a self-referential system of 
utterance' (Schabert, quoted in Keener 160). Biographical facts, authorial comments, and 
references supplement one another. Together they convey a creative vision of the 
author's inner experience, his mental process of wrestling with the grief that necessitated 
the auto/biographical narrative. At the beginning of 'Portrait of an Invisible Man', Auster 
recounts his immediate impulse in preserving his father's life, but recognizes his father's 
death as the latest installment in a lifelong absence (Eakin How Our Lives Become Stories 
88). Having no family dependent on him, devoid of passion for anything or anyone, there 
is no one whose life would be altered by his absence. The self of Sam Auster eludes the 
world beyond his death since he never entered a real relationship with the world: 'He did 
not seem to be a man occupying space, but rather a block of impenetrable space in the 
form of a man. The world bounced off him, shattered against him, at times adhered to 
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him—but it never got through' (7). The nature of Sam Auster's life is summarized in the 
author's commentary on the relationship between his father and the family house: 
The point is: his life was not centered around the place where he lived. His 
house was just one of many stopping places in a restless, unmoored existence, and 
this lack of center had the effect of turning him into a perpetual outsider, a tourist 
of his own life (9). 
The essence of Sam Auster's self, in this light, is his invisibility to both the world and 
himself. Such a self could hardly be said to exist, since self only exists in recognition by 
and in relation to others. In Auster's narration, the domain of the other was unreal to Sam 
Auster and his incursions into that domain were made with 'a part of himself he 
considered to be equally unreal' (15). The snapshots of Sam Auster as a bachelor show ‘a 
man who finds life tolerable only by staying on the surface of himself, an automatic liar 
who talked about himself in the third person, whose truth no one would know about (17). 
What people saw was a surrogate self, while Sam Auster 'remained invisible, a puppeteer 
working the strings of his alter-ego from a dark，solitary place behind the curtain' (16). 
The photographs of the author's parents recall the absence of affection Sam Auster 
showed at his son's birth as well as his grandson's. The distance between himself and his 
self, and the silence over his inner life in Sam Auster drives the author to the conclusion 
of the essence of his auto/biographical project as failure: one could not find the man 
within someone if it has eluded even that person himself, or construct a portrait of 
invisibility. 
Auster's confession of failure justifies what would be otherwise an impossible 
task: the confession shifts the emphasis from narrative coalescence to the author's 
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struggle in his search. While the essence of the subject remains impossible to grasp, the 
self of Sam Auster is now constructed with the scattered evidence and the author's 
memories of his existence. The author poses as the other to his father, and attempts to 
trace the self of Sam Auster through his own perception. The recollection of the past, 
shared between father and son, takes the form of examination of the author's 
consciousness: from his earliest memories of his father's absence, to his later memory of 
craving for his father's attention. In between these memories of frustration and a later 
sense of disappointment was a brief moment of intimacy, when Sam Auster told the 
author a story when they were alone in the room，a story that seemed to explain the 
mysterious nature of Sam Auster but turned out to be fictional. In the back of the child's 
mind was a desire to impress his father, but his failure in the baseball match showed 
success would not have made any difference. The author was reminded of the distance 
between Sam Auster and him, who was defined for his father by what he was, and they 
were ‘fixed in an immovable relationship, cut off from each other on opposite sides of a 
wall' (24). Auster interrupts his narration and comments on the relationship between his 
father and the world, including himself in the picture: 
Like everything else in his life, he saw me only through the mists of his 
solitude, as if at several removes from himself. The world was a distant place for 
him, I think, a place he was never truly able to enter, and out there in the distance, 
among all the shadows that flitted past him, I was bom, became his son, and grew 
up, as if I were just one more shadow, appearing and disappearing in a half-lit 
realm of his consciousness (24). 
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The author's attempt in reaching his father's inner world only exemplifies the gulf he has 
been trying to bridge and the certainty of failure: Auster realizes how he, as an other to 
his father, was unreal throughout the latter's life. Such realization turns the 
auto/biographical enterprise an increasingly difficult task, as the lack of relationality of 
their shared life surfaces. As the author begins to lose touch with what he is writing, 
words from Van Gogh offers consolation and enables Auster to write despite his grief: 
"Like everyone else, I feel the need of family and friendship, affection and 
friendly intercourse. I am not made of stone and iron, like a hydrant or a lamp-
post" 
Perhaps this is what really counts: to arrive at the core of human feeling, 
in spite of evidence (28). 
Fragmentation underlines the author's portrayal of his father, as Auster resorts to 
the 'tiniest of images' of his father in his memories, such as the image of father and son 
driving through downtown Newark, and the size of his father's hands. A violent display 
of emotions in Sam Auster comes into the picture, as the author returns to the family 
house as a representation of his father's mind. Sam Auster 'flew into an uncontrollable 
rage' when he found out the author and his wife had raised all the shades to let in the 
daylight during one of their stay at the house (31). Returning to his commentary, Auster 
describes his father's life as a constant effort in avoiding confrontation with an 
unstoppable force of fury within, by 'nurturing a kind of automatic behavior that would 
allow him to pass to the side of it' (31). If Auster has obtained a glimpse into the inner 
world of his father, it is only an insight into how Sam Auster disabled himself from 
feeling. The readers witness Auster's struggling in presenting the essence of his father's 
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nature, through ‘the creation of a realizable system of images' (Dow 274). The creation 
turns out to be self-defeating, as hinted by the trick photograph of Sam Auster, 
reproduced within the text. The multiple images are surrounded by gloom and stillness, 
and the possibility of eye contact among the various selves is denied: 'Each one is 
condemned to go on staring into space...It is a picture of death, a portrait of an invisible 
man'. The various portraits Auster has established of his father brings the author back to 
his starting point: the essence of Sam Auster's self remains invisible. The realization not 
only drives Auster to a second confession of the failure of his auto/biographical 
enterprise, but of the pain it inflicts on him, which threatens to defeat his original purpose 
of writing: 
There has been a wound, and I realize now that it is very deep. Instead of 
healing me as I thought it would, the act of writing has kept this wound open.. • 
I seems to be afflicted, cursed by some failure of mind to concentrate on 
what I am doing...Never before have I been so aware of the rift between thinking 
and writing (32). 
The image of the distracted writing recalls an earlier image of Sam Auster: 'he seemed to 
lose his concentration, to forget where he was, as if he had lost the sense of his own 
continuity' (29). The author's investigation of Sam Auster's inability to feel has caused 
the same disability in himself. This second confession again gives the narrative a greater 
momentum by acknowledging its deficit. The focus of the story is the author's invention 
of his subject in his present consciousness, and the relationality of the shared life will be 
created through the son's attempt in understanding his father: 
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I not only see him as he was, but as he is, as he will be.. .lying in the coffin 
underground, his body still intact, his fingernails and hair continuing to grow. A 
feeling that if I am to understand anything, I must penetrate this image of 
darkness, that I must enter the absolute darkness of earth (33). 
The self of Sam Auster, comprised by different texts, unfolds between 
contradictions in the second half of 'Portrait of an Invisible Man'. While the use of 
different genres - letters from strangers, newspaper cuttings, autobiographical anecdotes, 
quotations 一 offers the author new insights into the personality of his father, it also 
confirms the impossibility of any unified knowledge of his subject. The nature of Sam 
Auster’ s self remains multiple and partly hidden from the author, as suggested by the 
only document of the history of Sam Auster，s family. A photograph of his family taken 
when Sam was no more than a year old, it seems to convey an 'indestructible sense of the 
past' and turns out to be the opposite: Auster's grandfather, who died when Sam was 
seven, had been cut of the picture (33). The truth about this death was only uncovered by 
a chance meeting of Auster's cousin and a stranger, who provided the details in a cover 
letter and relevant newspaper articles. Reproduced in the narratives, they provide the 
details of the murder of Sam's father by his mother. The facts are portrayed in a 
sensational, flawed writing style of the media of the time, and are further undermined by 
fictional statements. While the extent of truth to the story - the first major and most 
traumatic incident of Sam Auster's life — remains unverifiable, the author could only 
speculate its effects on the formation of his father's self with the limited additional 
information offered by Sam Auster. The story of Auster's grandmother seizing the money 
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his father had saved for a bicycle was a typical scene of the latter，s childhood. In the 
author's words: 'This was rule by caprice. For a child, it meant that the sky could fall on 
the top of him at any moment, that he could never be sure of anything. Therefore, he 
learned never to trust anyone. Not even himself...he learned not to want anything too 
much' (50). The insecurity created an irrational desire in Sam Auster for money as a 
means of protection, and Auster elaborates on a kind of 'perceptual primitivism' in his 
father's attitude: as everything was understood in terms of its function and its cost, Sam 
Auster denied himself 'intimate contact with the shapes and textures of the world' (53). 
Auster supports his commentary with a quotation from Marx about money being the 
'bond of all bonds' and ‘the universal agent of separation’，and autobiographical 
anecdotes about the unwillingness to spend in his father (53，emphasis original). 
Seeing his relationship with money as the key to the man behind the surrogate 
self, for a brief moment Auster seems to have achieved a relatively solid understanding of 
the self of his father. The use of further references, however, soon destroys the illusion of 
unified knowledge as Auster digs deeper into his memories and other references. Unlike 
the detached and petty man at home, Sam Auster was a kind, generous, soft-hearted 
landlord to his tenants, known as 'Mr. Sam'. Of all the evidence of Sam Auster's life the 
author found in the family house, he is happiest to have retrieved a letter from a previous 
tenant who wrote to repay from twelve years ago and thank Mr. Sam for his kindness to 
her family. The letter, reproduced in the narrative, serves as the living proof of Sam 
Auster's capacity of feeling, alongside Auster's personal testimonies of the shared 
moments between father and son. The author witnessed the tenants' affection towards his 
father when they collected rent, and the impression it left on him remains in his present 
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consciousness, 'as immediate as a splinter in the thumb' (58). Sam Auster came across as 
a light-hearted and affectionate father when Auster spilled tar over himself by accident, 
producing a moment of intimacy for the author: ‘It had suddenly become possible for me 
to feel close to him’ (59). A businessman and a work alcoholic, he disapproved of his 
son's occupation as a writer, but went to the public library to read the author's poetry. A 
helpful friend, a loving uncle, Sam Auster also made a caring father when he witnessed a 
transaction between Auster and a rich businessman and realized his son could take care of 
himself on his own terms. It remains impossible to conclude what a person Sam Auster 
was, or how he actually felt towards the author. Quotations from Issac Babel and Proust, 
about how an offspring's perceives his/her father as a distinctive individual and the best 
father in the world despite objective evidence, increase the author's confusion since he 
has obviously failed in both: 
The rampant, totally mystifying force of contradiction.. .Impossible to say 
anything without reservation: he was good, or he was bad; he was this, or he was 
that. All of them are true. At times I have the feeling that I am writing about three 
or four different men, each one distinct, each one a contradiction of all others. 
Fragments. Or the anecdote as a form of knowledge. 
Yes (61). 
Contrary to the emphasis on a definite portrayal of the subject's personality in a 
conventional auto/biographical narrative, Auster suggests an alternative form for the 
enterprise: fragmentation as the faithful representation of life. The self of Sam Auster is 
constructed in its different facets in relation to various others in his life, which highlights 
the essentially multiple nature of self in any person, as the self is defined in relation to 
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various others at different moments. Knowledge is a slow accretion, a series of 
intellectual proximities in 'Portrait of an Invisible Man'. The story of the author's 
struggle in constructing the portrait gives substance to the story, since the story of the 
subject's self cannot be fully told. The author's reliance of deferral embodies his attempt 
in giving meaning to his auto/biographical act, which he confesses in his final 
commentary on the writing of the narrative: 
The closer I come to the end of what I am able to say, the more reluctant I 
am to say anything. I want to postpone the moment of ending, and in this way 
delude myself into thinking that I have only just begun, that the better part of my 
story still lies ahead. No matter how useless these words might seem to be, they 
have nevertheless stood between me and a silence that continues to terrify me. 
When I step into this silence, it will mean my father has vanished forever (65). 
If Auster has come to see the essence of his father more than before during the writing of 
'Portrait of an Invisible Man，，neither the essence of the self or the author's 
understanding could be communicated into words. While the self cannot be fully 
presented in writing, to stop writing is to stop re-creating the image of the self. The 
alternation of genres in the last pages of the narrative concludes the nature of life writing 
in The Invention of Solitude: to constantly re-create life in the present, and to endow 
writing with life-giving power that points to the future. Auster returns to the beginning of 
his search towards the end of the narrative: to understand the nature of his father's life 
through understanding the nature of his death. The truth of Sam Auster's life is finally 
unverifiable, as incorrect facts are printed in the obituary in the newspaper. Auster 
attempts to imagine the experience of a heart attack, to experience the same mortal pain 
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his father went through, but admits the impossibility of intimacy across in memories. The 
author's contemplation is interrupted by a brief passage by Kierkegaard: '...only he who 
descends into the underworld rescues the beloved...he who is willing to work gives birth 
to his father' (68). By penetrating the image of darkness, the image that governs both the 
life and death of Sam Auster, the author nevertheless recreates his father's self and saves 
him from obscurity. The auto/biographical enterprise also urges Auster to look to the 
future, to the life that will continue to grow: 'An image of Daniel now...of his sweet and 
ferocious little body, as he lies upstairs in his crib asleep. To end with this' (69). The 
interaction of the concluding passages and images of 'Portrait of an Invisible Man’ 
illumines the subtle dialectic of the plot of The Invention of Solitude.. Auster must 
continue to penetrate the image of darkness to save his father, in order to become a better 
son as well as a better father to his son, Daniel. 
The impossibility of understanding and presenting the biographical subject in 
'Portrait of an Invisible Man', for Auster, is related to the question of human 
understanding and biography in general: how problematic it is to presume to know 
anything about anyone else; how one might begin to speak about another person, and 
whether or not it is impossible (Auster The Art of Hunger 276). The self of Sam Auster is 
created by the author in 'Portrait of an Invisible Man', in the form of fragmentation and 
partial knowledge. Such creation is only made possible by the author's attempt in 
understanding the subjectivity of other - of his father's as a child, of Van Gogh's when 
the author himself wrestled with depression - in view of constant setbacks throughout the 
autobiographical project. The understanding of the self of Sam Auster thus depends on a 
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certain distance between the author and his others, and on the author establishing the 
connections between the two. In the universe in The Invention of Solitude, distance, 
instead of proximity, is the helpmate to intimacy. Sam Auster was only ever absent in his 
presence, and his self was only present in the son's mind as the author, with anguish, 
worked through his memories and other references. 
The same formula applies to the understanding of self in the second part of The 
Invention of Solitude, ‘The Book of Memory', a consciously fictional and collective 
autobiographical narrative. The nature of referentiality of 'The Book of Memory' is 
illustrated in the opening pages of the narrative, as the readers witness the split 
intentionality of the autobiographer and the narrative as an inter-text. The understanding 
of one's self depends on distance, while the readers' understanding of the 
autobiographical self is enhanced by the double self-consciousness in the narrative. 'The 
Book of Memory' begins with the unnamed narrator failing to make sense of what he has 
written, and coming to the decision of referring to himself as 'A'. The picture of the 
autobiographer in motion demonstrates the paradox of self-abnegation I discussed in my 
introduction: the narrative's claim to referentiality lies in the recognition of the divorce 
between writing persona and the written self, and communication between me and myself 
is only possible as the T becomes a ‘he’ (Renza 279). The narrator also has a fictive 
fictionality about his disguise, since he unmasks himself later in the narrative: 'he speaks 
of himself as another in order to tell the story of himself. He must make himself absent 
in order to find himself there' (154). The Book of Memory' is the title of the second part 
of The Invention of Solitude, and also a recurrent refrain within the section, sub-divided 
into numerous separate books, at times taking a life of its own, which sometimes Auster 
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refers to as a separate entity (Adams 97). The readers, as well as Auster, are witnessing 
the consciousness of the narrator A, who contemplates over the form of his narrative as a 
mixture of references to himself and others: 
To follow with Bruno's notion that the structure of human thought 
corresponds to the structure of nature. And therefore to conclude that everything, 
in some sense, is connected with everything else. 
At the same time, as if running parallel to the above, a brief disquisition on 
the room. An image, for example, of a man sitting alone in a room. As in Pascal: 
"All the unhappiness of man stems from one thing only: that he is incapable of 
staying quietly in his room" (76). 
The depiction of A，s thoughts not only states the main themes of ‘The Book of 
Memory', but also underlines the inter-subjectivity in the narrative. Both the recounting 
self and the recounted self in The Book of Memory' are fictions created by the author, 
and both of these selves are partly comprised of the consciousness of others. The 
recollection of A's life in his room in Book One of 'The Book of Memory' is a fictional 
manifestation of Pascal's statement: 'These four walls hold only the signs of his own 
disquiet, and in order to find some measure of peace in these surroundings, he must dig 
more and more deeply into himself (79). The autobiographical self is also constructed in 
relation to its significant other in 'Portrait of an Invisible Man', since the second part of 
The Invention of Solitude is a continuation of the task that remains incomplete in the first 
part: to enter the realm of darkness in order to locate the self. A. is described to be 
constantly watching his own disappearance: 'as if, by crossing the threshold of this room, 
he were entering another dimension, taking up residence inside a black hole' (77). The 
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sense of discontinuity between himself and his self A suffers recalls the lack of center of 
Sam Auster: 'as if he were living somewhere to the side of himself~not really here, but 
not anywhere else either' (78). To heal the wound inflicted by his father's absence, one 
that is inflamed by the writing of 'Portrait of an Invisible Man', the son must experience 
the same solitude in darkness, to expel the void and locate oneself in the world he is in: 
'Only one thing is certain: he cannot be anywhere until he is here' (79). 
Confinement is a kind of exile, a theme supplemented by the references to Jonah, 
Gepetto，Pinocchio, Crusoe and George Oppen's phrase: ‘the shipwreck of the singular' 
(79). Meanings are established as one sees the parallels between one's life and others', 
and writing begins when the self comes into interaction with other selves. In his first 
commentary on the nature of chance, A. narrates the story of his friend who rented the 
same Paris chamber de bonne his father had hidden out in more than twenty years ago. In 
the subsequent autobiographical anecdote, A. comments how the story of his friend has 
no meaning, and yet this meaninglessness drives him to write: if chance, instead of 
destiny, governs one's life, all lives function according to the same randomness; a certain 
pattern, however, can be established in this randomness and writing is what endows life 
with meaning. The saying by Pascal is repeated and followed by a quotation from 
Desartes, written in his room in Amsterdam roughly the same time as Pascal's words 
entered Pensees: ‘ "Is there any country," he asked with exuberance, "in which one can 
enjoy freedom as enormously as one does here?'" The interaction of quotations forms a 
part of the anecdote of A. visiting Anne Frank's house in Amsterdam, in which A. 
pictured her writing in her room and her imaginary life in university, reading Descartes' 
Meditations, had she lived after the war. The coincidences confirm A's belief in the inter-
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relatedness between all things, which creates a moment of illumination for A: ‘he 
suddenly found himself crying...as if purely in response to the world. It was at that 
moment, he later realized, that The Book of Memory began' (83). The immersion of self 
in the world takes place during solitary wandering, and the depiction of A.'s as a 
wanderer in Amsterdam comes across as an allusion to Thoreau's writing on solitude and 
relations in Walden: 
Cut off from everything that was unfamiliar to him, unable to discover 
even a single point of reference, he saw that his steps, by taking him nowhere, 
were taking him nowhere but into himself. He was wandering inside himself, and 
he was lost. Far from troubling him, this state of being lost became a source of 
happiness, of exhilaration...As if on the brink of some previously hidden 
knowledge, he breathed into his very bones and said to himself, almost 
triumphantly: I am lost (87). 
In a similar vein, Thoreau declares in The Village' in Walden, that 'not till we are 
completely lost...not till we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and 
realizes where we are and the infinite extent of our relations' (217). 
Solitude, rather than offering a stable ground of experience in a single 
autobiographical discourse, is constructed by both Thoreau and Auster as a means of 
connecting with the world through multiple, metamorphic selves (Ford 205). The 
understanding of relations between oneself and others translates itself into an integral part 
of the autobiographical experience, as self and world, like life and death, are one in the 
universe of ‘The Book of Memory'. As one could experience the infinitude of one's 
interiority while being lost in the world, one could also glimpse into the infinitude of the 
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exterior world in one's confinement. The force of parallel lives manifests itself in the 
next two books of ‘The Book of Memory', and points to the breakdown of boundary 
between near and far, self and other, present and past. The infinitude of possibilities of 
the self is discussed in as A. recollects his friendship with S.，a Russian composer who 
was perfectly content with his life in his small, dark room: everything he could possibly 
need was contained in that room, a miniature cosmology that was also the representation 
of his inner world. The image of S. in the room alludes to the image of A. as well as to 
the image of Sam Auster, while his thoughts and actions - his exclamation over the 
wonders of his time, and his arrangement of furniture in his room - reminded A. of 
Descartes' words and the life of Crusoe: 'shipwreck in the heart of the city' (91). S. 
endowed his life with meaning by working on a giant composition that would never be 
finished, and in A.'s narration, S.'s reliance on deferral is the means to the transcendence 
of self: 
...what for another man might have led to an impasse of despair was for 
him a source of boundless, quixotic hope...To have conceived of something 
within the realm of possibility—a work that could have been finished, and 
therefore detached from himself—would have vitiated the enterprise. The point 
was to fall short, but to do so only in attempting the most outlandish thing he 
could conjure for himself. The end result, paradoxically, was humility, a way of 
gagging his own insignificance in relation to God. For only in the mind of God 
were such dreams as S.'s possible. But by dreaming in the way he did, S. had 
found a way of participating in all that was beyond him, of drawing several inches 
closer to the heart of the infinite (91-2). 
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The story of S. also illuminates on the possibility of transcending oneself for A. in 
the light of parallels between their lives: S was bom in the same year as A.'s father did, 
while A. is the same age as S.'s younger son. Their relationship offers a kind of 
psychological compensation for A.'s for the absence of his own father, and A.'s failure 
in getting in touch with S. after Sam Auster's death was another example of constant 
deferral: to postpone the possibility of S.'s death, to preserve the memory of their bond in 
the same way as he defers the end of death of his father in the narrative. The intersection 
of lives could take place across time, between past and present, as further coincidences 
formed a part of their friendship: the picture of S. and A. shows the same evocation of 
friendship as a picture of S. as a young man alongside the son of Marina Tsvetayeva, who 
stands in A.'s mind as one of the greatest Russian poets. The death of her son, Mur, was 
recounted to A. and his wife by their former neighbor Dr. Altschuller. The grief over the 
death of a beloved other is elaborated in Book Four through references to various 
illustrations concerning the deaths of children: Rembrandt's son, Titus; Sir Walter 
Raleigh and his son Wat; Anne Frank; Mur; the children of Cambodia and Atlanta who 
suffered from famine. The images of sorrows and loss paint the background for the main 
autobiographical stories in 'The Book of Memory': the illness of A.'s son, Daniel, who 
could have died if A. and his wife had not taken him to the doctor in time; and the death 
of A.'s grandfather. A. resorts to one of his textual others in order to exorcise the panic he 
experienced when Daniel's life was in danger, by returning to his earlier translations of 
the fragments written by Mallarme at the bedside of his dying son, Anatole: 
...it was a way for him to relive his own moment of panic in the doctor's 
office: it is too much for me. I cannot face it. for it was only at that moment.. .that 
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he had finally grasped the flill scope of his own fatherhood: the boy's life meant 
more than his own; if dying was necessary to save his son, he would be willing to 
die...Translating those forty or so fragments by Mallarme...had become the 
equivalent of offering a prayer of thanks for the life of his son (110). 
The fragments, reproduced in ‘The Book of Memory', communicate the sadness of 
Mallarme as well as those of all others who lost their beloved ones. The transcendence of 
one's sorrows happens at a moment of empathy, of experiencing what others have 
experienced; the dialogue between the past and the present sorrows of the world, one that 
is established by the story of Daniel's illness, also highlights the importance of hope for 
A.: 
A. looks at his son and realizes he must not allow himself to despair. 
There is this responsibility for a young life, and that he has brought this life into 
being. Minute by minute, hour by hour, as he remains in the presence of his 
son...giving himself up to this young life, which is a continual injunction to 
remain in the present, he feels his despair evaporate' (156-7). 
The theme of devotion to living, to engaging oneself in life despite its apparent despairs 
is supplemented by the story of A.，s grandfather: a man of 'bizarre and grandiose 
optimisms', an amateur magician, A.'s grandfather was someone who lived his life as if it 
was magic and delighted people into believing in make-believe. Even in his deathbed, 
A.'s grandfather would never mention the possibility of death and devoted his energy to 
remembering his past and prolonging his life. A. ends the portrait of his grandfather by 
the image of himself rejoicing over in being: ‘He finds it extraordinary, even in the 
ordinary actuality of his experience, to feel his feet on the ground, to feel his lungs 
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expanding' (121). Being alive is a source of joy in itself, if death owns life all along and 
can claim life at any moment. The capacity in engaging oneself in illusory hopes is 
essential to living as well as to the writing of The Invention of Solitude: one lives and 
writes despite the certainty of death and failure, and meaning is asserted by one 
delighting in the act of living and writing. 
The nature of the autobiographical narrative and self in ‘The Book of Memory', in 
the light of the above discussion, would echo Michael Sprinker's formulation of 
subjectivity that I referred to in Chapter One: every text is an articulation of the relations 
between texts and every self is the articulation of an intersubjectivity，a waving together 
of what has been produced elsewhere in discontinuous points in at any moment in time 
(Sprinker 325). The narrative's claim to referentiality is strengthened as the author 
recognizes his self as a composite, and lets the various voices that inhibit his self speak 
through him in 'The Book of Memory'. Collective experience is preserved in the 
memoirs of individual experience, while the author's self changes as it interacts with 
other selves. A similar dialectic directs the rest of narrative, in which the story of self is 
told through the stories of others. The autobiographical self is constituted by other fictive 
selves in the text, and the autobiographical truth is only communicable through allusions. 
The theme of je est un autre is illuminated by Auster's use of 'mirror texts' - tales of 
solitary darkness, of one's search of the father. Auster's commentary on the first of these 
mirror texts, The Book of Johan, is an expression of his own authorial statements about 
the writing of ‘The Book of Memory': 
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This brief work...written in the third person, is more dramatically a story 
of solitude than anything else in the Bible, and yet is told as if from outside that 
solitude, as if, by plunging into the darkness of that solitude, the "I" has vanished 
from itself. It cannot speak about itself, therefore, except as another. As in 
Rimbaud's phrase: "Je est un autre" (124). 
The story of Johan, for Auster, symbolizes the impossibility of speaking the truth: the 
prophecy would only remain true if Johan would not speak about the destruction of the 
Ninevites, who would repent and be spared if they had been delivered God's message. 
The second mirror text, the poem Cassandra, also embodies a similar paradox: the truth 
is destined never to be believed, and would be true if it remains untold. The truth could 
only be alluded to, and is only bom in the silence and the darkness of solitude: both Johan 
and Lord Royston, the author of the English translation of Cassandra, met the doom of 
the shipwreck. The whale of the belly turned out to mean Johan's deliverance instead of 
his death, as he finally cried out to God: 'In the darkness of solitude, the tongue is finally 
loosened, and at the moment it begins to speak, there is an answer. And even if there is 
no answer, the man has begun to speak' (125-6). 
The descent to the darkness of death is thus the rite to rebirth, and one must begin 
to speak despite the uncertainty of deliverance. This is the same paradox lies at the heart 
of Auster's search for his father: the son must enter the realm of darkness and save the 
father in order to become a better son. The author's effort is what vitiates the 
autobiographical act, despite the impossibility of grasping the truth of his father's self. 
The answer lies in the future as Auster becomes a better father to his son, and realizes 
both the possibilities of his fatherhood and self-hood. The main mirror text to The 
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Invention of Solitude is the story of Pinocchio, a tale about the taking hold of the self: 
through adventures, mischief, progress and setbacks, the puppet comes to a gradual 
dawning of conscience, an awareness of what he wants to become. In order to become a 
real boy, he must save his father from the darkness of the belly of the Terrible Shark, and 
swim through the desolate water (131-2). The story of Pinocchio manifests the gist of the 
creation of The Invention of Solitude, and the parallels are highlighted as the narration 
returns to A. reading the story to his son, Daniel: 
A. has watched his son's face carefully during these readings of 
Pinocchio. He has concluded that it is the image of Pinocchio saving Gepetto that 
gives the story meaning for him...for the boy to see Pinocchio...who is not even a 
real boy, to become the figure of redemption, the very being who saves his father 
from the grip of death, is a sublime moment of revelation. The son saves the 
father. This must be fully imagined from the perspective of the little boy. And 
this, in the mind of the father who was once a little boy, a son, that is, to his own 
father, must be fully imagined. Puer aeternus. The son saves the father (133-4). 
The grasping of one's self-hood - both as a father to his son and a son to his father -
comes from understanding the selves of both his textual other and significant other in real 
life. The presence of one's self in writing is created in the use of a surrogate self, from 
instilling the autobiographical into the fictional. In a later commentary on the writing of 
Pinocchio, Auster suggests the book was for Collodi's a book of memory, and the 
conception of Pinocchio as Collodi's double describes the creative process of The 
Invention of Solitude: T o dip the puppet into the inkwell, therefore, was to use his 
creation to write the story of himself. For it is only in the darkness of solitude that the 
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work of memory begins' (164). The use of mirror texts, as well as story-telling, is 
elevated to the 'means of establishing or re-establishing human kinship' in 'The Book of 
Memory' (Brooker 158). The power of fiction lies in its ability in breaking down one's 
absorption in oneself and one's solitude: ‘A story...break down those walls. For it posits 
the existence of others and allows the listener to come into contact with them—if only in 
his thoughts' (152). Story telling is the key to resurrection in the another important mirror 
text to 'The Book of Memory', The Thousands and One Nights: Sherhad risks her life to 
tell the stories about death, and saves her life as well as those of all the daughters' in the 
kingdom. Speaking is again the beginning of one's deliverance, and the truth of one's 
story - the preservation of lives - is only alluded to in the stories of one's grief over the 
loss of a beloved other. 
The use of mirror texts in ‘The Book of Memory' is not limited to literary texts 
but includes paintings and pictures. Although none of them is reproduced in the narrative, 
Auster nevertheless gives them the same importance with detailed description, turning 
them into fictional illustrations. The use of references to other artworks as the 
representation of one's emotional state touches on the nature of self in the 
autobiographical narrative: what constitutes this interiority that is regarded as the self of 
the autobiographer? Is this interiority the referent to the written self in the text, or is it 
created by the act of constructing a self in the narrative? The story of A.'s life, and the 
essence of his self, is solitude: 'everything he is trying to record in The Book of Memory, 
everything he has written so far, is no more than the translation of a moment or two of his 
life—those moments he lived through on Christmas Eve, 1979, in his room at 6 Varick 
street' (136). The inner intensity created by those moments of inwardness, by the solitary 
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darkness, motivates A. to seek tangible representation of his emotional state in works of 
arts. The self of A. experiences its important change as A. visited Van Gogh Museum and 
attempted to inhibit the room presented on the canvas The Bedroom: 
...he began to experience it as a prison, an impossible space...not so much 
of a place to live, but of the mind that has been forced to live there...Stifled 
among the furniture and everyday objects of the room，you begin to hear a cry of 
suffering in this painting...But there is no answer...The main in this painting (and 
this is a self-portrait, no different from a picture of a man's face, with eyes, nose, 
lips and jaw) has been alone too much, has struggled too much in the depths of 
solitude. The world ends at that barricaded door. For the room is not a 
representation of solitude, it is the substance of solitude itself (142-3). 
The depiction echoes the opening images of 'The Book of Memory': A. trying to locate 
himself in confinement and presenting his self in the writing about the room. The 
reference to The Bedroom is an illumination of a change in the autobiographical self as A. 
inhibits the painter's solitude and realizes that there is a limit to the solitude one can 
endure. One must reach out of this solitude - of one's self - to be in touch with others 
and the world. The re-invention of the solitude of Van Gogh is also an act of entering 
someone else's solitude for A.: once a solitude has been breached, it becomes a kind of 
companionship (136). Solitude is the force that enables one to realizes one’ connections 
with others, and claim someone else's experience as one's own, thus transcending the 
limit of individual consciousness. 
The change in nature of autobiographical experience, in 'The Book of Memory', 
is also parallel to the change in the nature of memory in the narrative: the continuance of 
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self depends on memory, and individual memories turn collective as one recognizes the 
merging of individual and collective consciousness: 
'Memory, therefore, not simply as the resurrection of one's private past, 
but an immersion in the past of others...Everything, therefore, is present in his 
mind at once, as if each element were reflecting the light of all the others...If 
there is any reason for him to be in this room now, it is because there is something 
inside him hungering to see it all at once...And yet, the telling of it is necessarily 
slow, a delicate business of trying to remember what has already been 
remembered (139). 
Both collective and individual memories, being a part of each other, is immeasurable for 
the individual. The vastness of memory is pinpointed in the quotation from Augustine: 
Although it is a part of my nature, I cannot understand all that I am. This 
means, then, that the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. But where is 
that part of it which it does not contain? Is it somewhere outside and not within it? 
how, then, can it be a part of it, if it is not contained in it? (89). 
Auster's answer is that one's memories are scattered around the world, and the 
experience of oneself and that of the world could become one in one's consciousness. In 
an autobiographical anecdote, A. recounts how his son recalled a past incident from three 
or four months ago, as they walked past the same spot: 
It occurred to A. that if in some sense the world imprints itself on our 
minds, it is equally true that our experience are imprinted on the world. For that 
brief moment as they walked by the pizza parlor, the boy was literally seeing his 
own past...To wander about in the world, then, is also to wander in ourselves. 
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That is to say, the moment we step into the space of memory, we walk into the 
world (166). 
On the other hand, if there is no difference between seeing and remembering, memory is 
not so much as the past contained within us, but as proof of our life in the present: 'If a 
man is to be truly present among his surroundings... He must forget himself in order to be 
there. And from that forgetfulness arises the power of memory. It is a way of living one's 
life so that nothing is ever lost' (128). 
If the major task of the autobiographical narrative is the preservation of one's past 
and self, Auster commentary suggests one must forget the self as the center of one's 
consciousness but immerse oneself in the world. The self is preserved in the merging of 
consciousness — the infinitude of the exterior world and that of one's interior world. The 
barrier between self and world, near and far, present and past is again invalidated, and the 
act of remembering is what postpones the entrance of death in one's life. In the 
concluding pages of 'The Book of Memory', A. narrates himself remembering his 
childhood as a way of reliving his perception of the world. Not long after he concludes 
his recollection with the phrase 'this was the only thing [his mother] could remember', A. 
dreams of himself having to die, to face death as an imminent certainty (169). The 
autobiographer must continue to remember and to write, and the preservation of one's life 
could also mean the preservation of collective lives. The act of writing, in the world in 
The Invention of Solitude, is an act of violating space. 'The Book of Memory', as an 
independent entity within Auster’ s memoirs, is concluded with the lines from a letter by 
Nadezhda Mandelstam to his wife dated 1938, supposedly written before his death and 
was never sent: 
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I have no words, my darling, to write this letter...! am writing into empty 
space. Perhaps you will come back and not find me here. Then this is what you 
will have left to remember by...Life can last so long. How hard and long for each 
of us to die alone (171). 
Auster's perception of writing as a violation of space is not only the means of breaking 
down the boundary between himself and his others in the text, but also an attempt in 
entering the solitude of his father, who was described 'a block of impenetrable space' at 
the beginning of The Invention of Solitude (7). The son is forever committed to his 
attempt in entering the solitude of his father, in understanding the self within. The 
distance between the living and deceased is bridged - between the son and his father, as 
well as between Auster and his others in the text — by the act of writing. The invention of 
solitude 一 the reconstruction of one's self in writing - must continue for the writer. The 
autobiographical self is created as an inter-subjectivity of all others that comprise the self, 
and the mission of the autobiographer is to present this shared consciousness in his 
memoirs. One must always go back to the beginning and continually create the self, as 
depicted in the image on the last page of The Invention of Solitude., 'He finds a fresh 
sheet of paper. He lays it out on the table before him and writes these words with his pen. 




The notion je est un autre has drawn me to the study of the issue of self-presence and 
self-creation in autobiographical writings, as I believed it embodies the heart of the 
writing about oneself: self, as an interiority with the writer, could never be communicated 
in the narrative except as a fiction, as an 'other' one intends as he writes, as Renza puts it 
(292). The distance between oneself and his/her self, as I have argued throughout this 
thesis, plays an important role in presentation of the self in the text. The authors of my 
chosen texts explicitly turn their selves into fictions in their autobiographical narratives, 
as the means to communication between themselves and the readers. The extent of truth 
these selves lay claim to remains uncertain, though one could never obtain the answer to 
the same question in any piece of autobiographical writing. If the self is a continual 
unfolding even within the autobiographer, the glimpse the readers are offered is indeed 
only the truth of the autobiographer at the moment of writing; and in the autobiographical 
fictions I have chosen for this study, this moment of truth needs to be recognized as the 
truth of the moment or at certain moments, instead of the means of conferring unity on 
the self across time. 
The notion je est un autre has also inspired a major part of my argument in that 
for me, the communication between a writer and his/her readers must have been 
grounded in the communication between oneself and his/her self within the 
autobiographer. The presence of others is crucial to the presence of one's self in the 
autobiographical fictions discussed in this study: in the parodies in The Facts and The 
Book of Laughter and Forgetting, those who fail to acknowledge the presence of others 
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in their autobiographical universes ultimately undermine the presence or even the 
existence of their selves. The relationship between self and the world has been an 
recurrent focus in autobiographical criticism throughout the contextualization of 
autobiography and individualism, to the emphasis on relationality of self: the self is 
necessarily the center of the universe for the individual, but the individual must not forget 
the formative forces on the self by the exterior world and by all others in his life. In The 
Invention of Solitude, the autobiographical self transcends the limit of one's self by 
seeking connections with other selves across space and time, and the study of one self is 
also the study of the world. Such a transcendent subject reminds one of Olney's 
transcendental subjectivism I referred to in Chapter One, though one distinction has to be 
made: in Auster's universe, the self is transcend as it recognizes both the parallels 
between one's self and nature, as well as how the self is comprised by others; while in 
Olney's conception, such as in Metaphors of Self, which I quoted from in my 
introduction, the self and the world are one while universe is essentially seen as a vast 
projection of individual selves (49-50). 
The synthesis between self and the world also acquires a different meaning in the 
autobiographical fictions I study in this thesis: it is achieved through the interaction of the 
autobiographical selves and their fictional others in the texts. The unity between the 
author and his/her character, I believe, offers a kind of understanding and sympathy a 
writer would look for from his/her imaginary and distant readers: the understanding from 
a fellow human who has had the same experience as oneself has. In his article, 'Full of 
Life Now, Barret J. Mandel，argues that readers turn to autobiography for confirmation of 
his/her own perception of reality in terms of those experienced by another mortal, and 
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they turn to fictions as they for confirmation that there is value in playing, fantasizing, 
creating shape and order for their own sake (55). In the autobiographical fictions I have 
chosen, these two kinds of 'satisfaction', in Mandel's words, are offered to the readers at 
the same time as autobiography and fictions are joined in textual universes in which the 
autobiographers and their characters share the same experience, which the readers could 
also identify with. The writing of oneself, as Misch puts it, ‘springs from the most natural 
source, the joy in self-communication and in enlisting the sympathetic understanding of 
others' (qtd. in Marcus 148). Such self-communication only has its value when there are 
others to understand, and this sympathetic understanding from others is what expels the 




‘See also Deception: A Novel (1990), Patrimony: A True Story (1991) and Operation 
Shylock: A Confession (1993). Philip Roth appears as Philip in Deception, a novel about 
the deceptions one's imagination is willing to commit in order to create selves and others. 
Patrimony is a memoir about the death of Roth's father. In Operation Shylock, the 
narrator Philip Roth meets a man who may or may not be Philip Roth. The 'other' Roth is 
on his mission to lead the Jews out of Israel and back to Europe, and the 'real' Roth has 
to stop him even if it means impersonating his impersonator. 
“Philip Lejeune, On Autobiography. 
A collection of four works. The Ghost Writer (1979). The Anatomy Lesson (1981). 
Zuckerman Unbound (im). The Prague Orgy (1985) 
iv Zuckerman's demise happens in Deception, in which Philip Roth appears as Philip and 
discusses the death of his character with his mistress. Zuckerman's judgment about Roth 
being too nice in the mask of Philip will be proven wrong in the novel, since Philip in 
Deception deliberately invites other's judgment of him as 'bad' by his deceptions. 
V See note 4. 
Chapter Three 
w In the chapter on The Book of Laughter and Forgetting in her book Terminal Paradox: 
The Novel of Milan Kundera, Banjeree details lonesco's conception of his play and 
discusses the similarities between Rhinoceros and section seven of The Book of Laughter 
and Forgetting. lonesco has revealed that the source for his play was an account by Denis 
de Rougemount of a Nazi rally he witnessed in Nuremberg in 1948. When Hilter 
materalized and the crowd broke into a frenzy of enthusiasm, Rougement felt himself 
sucked into the vortex of mass hysteria, as if by the power of sacred horror. lonesco was 
particularly struck by Rougemeont's observation that his successful resistance to the 
collective fanaticism came from the same irrational depth of being as the seduction, and 
not from his intellect. From this autobiographical sketch, Inoesco drew his conception of 
‘rhinoceritis，一an ideological epidemic of fanatical conformism that suddenly and 
universally spreads—as a fundamental defect of the imagination that takes cover under 
the illusion of logic. The image of Berenger at the end of lonesco's last act, standing 
alone in a room where walls are crumbling under the butting horns of the beasts, trying to 
speak with a human voice over the roar of their trumpeting, finds a match in Kundera's 
text in the autobiographical section of the movement. The novel shows Kundera in his 
youth, a lonely dissenter roaming the festive streets of Prague when the government has 
just hanged the Czech surrealist Zavis Kalandra. All around Kundera, the angelic 
members of his generation are celebrating the victory of their murderous innocence by 
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